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HARVARD LAW REVIEW I
THE SUPREME COURT
1974 TERM
FOREWORD: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW
Henry P. Monaghan *
M R. JUSTICE Powell has publicly characterized the 1974
Term of the Supreme. Court as a "dull" one.' Whatever
the accuracy of that description,2 the 1974 Term was, in the
public eye, a quiet one. When, late in the Term, the Court
ordered the death penalty case ' held over for reargument, it en-
sured that the 1974 Term would generate few front-page testi-
monials to the supreme authority of the Supreme Court. But
neither a dull nor a quiet Term can obscure the current reality
that the Court's claim to be the "ultimate interpreter of the Con-
stitution" " appears to command more nearly universal respect
today than at any time since Chief Justice Marshall invoked that
document to deny Mr. Marbury the commission to which he was
* Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A., University of Massachusetts,
i9s; LL.B., Yale, 1958; LL.M., Harvard, i960.
' Opening remarks at the Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, June 27,
1975.
'No modem Term is, of course, without its significant decisions, ones that
frequently contribute far more to the enduring fabric of our law than their more
sensational counterparts. In that respect the 1974 Term was far from dull, as is
evident from the Court's decisions in the areas of criminal law, see pp. 51-70
infra, federal jurisdiction, see pp. 151-95 infra, antitrust, see pp. 202-I infra,
labor law, see pp. 234-54 infra, and securities regulation, see pp. 254-74 infra.
In the field of constitutional law some small moves were made in reducing the
considerable uncertainty presently enveloping judicial interpretations of due process
and equal protection. Apart from the sex discrimination cases- which continue
to be a law unto themselves, see, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975),
noted pp. 95-io4 infra- the Court seems to be returning to a "hands off" atti-
tude toward state economic and social legislation. For example, in Weinberger v.
Salfi, 95 S. Ct. 2457 (1975), noted pp. 77-85 infra, the Court sounded the death
knell for the much criticized irrebuttable presumption doctrine.
' State v. Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d 8%3 (1974), cert. granted sub nom.
Fowler v. North Carolina, 419 U.S. 963 (1974), restored for reargument, 95 S.
Ct. 2652 (1975).4 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969). See generally G. GuNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW 25-34 (9th ed. 1975).
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legally entitled.5 After a history of far more struggle than is
generally remembered, 6 it is now settled that (absent a constitu-
tional amendment) the Court has the last say, and in that sense
its constitutional interpretations are both authoritative and final."
The Court's great prestige has, however, tended to deflect
"careful inquiry into the limits beyond which its decisions, al-
though authoritative, are not final. Even as the Justices have
developed the habit of writing constitutional opinions that look
like detailed legislative codes,8 the Court's great prestige has
fostered the impression that every detailed rule laid down has
the same dignity as the constitutional text itself. This impression
should be understood as the illusion it is. Indeed, a wide variety
of Supreme Court pronouncements are subject to modification
and even reversal through ordinary political processes. For ex-
ample, Congress may validate a state law previously invalidated
by the Court as an unreasonable burden upon commerce. Simi-
larly, in Miranda v. Arizona,'° the Court explicitly recognized
that its "Miranda warnings" might be modified by Congress and,
perhaps, even by the states."
Were our understandings of judicial review not affected by
the mystique surrounding Marbury v. Madison,2 it might be
more readily recognized that a surprising amount of what passes
as authoritative constitutional "interpretation" is best understood
as something of a quite different order - a substructure of sub-
'Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (i8o3). The authority most
frequently invoked is Chief Justice Marshall's famous statement that "[uit is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is," id. at i77. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703, 705 (974),
noted in The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 41, 50 (1974).
6 See G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 25-34, 47-50.
" But, as United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (0974), recognizes, the ultimate
authority of the Supreme Court does not exclude an interpretative role for Con-
gress in the formulation of legislation, one which, as Professor Brest rightly ob-
serves, is not hindered by the important institutional constraints that limit judi-
cial review. See generally Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
' See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972). Judge Friendly has been a persistent critic of this practice. See, e.g.,
Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1301-02 (1975).
'See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 421, 423-24 (1946).
Where crucial questions turn not on issues of "law," but on issues of fact, char-
acterization or degree, a decision may be peculiarly subject to revision through the
ordinary legislative process. See Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional
Adjudication, 40 U. CiN. L. REV. 199, 205-II (197o). See also G. GUNTHER,
supra note 4, at 1033-39.
10384 U.S. 436 (1966).
" Id. at 467.
125 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (1803).
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stantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration
and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional
provisions; in short, a constitutional common law subject to
amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress. I hope
to demonstrate that a theory of such a constitutional common
law is necessary to explain satisfactorily a number of "constitu-
tional" doctrines, and to outline a principled basis for a spe-
cialized common law rooted in the Constitution. Finally, I will
suggest some implications of express recognition of a constitu-
tional common law of individual liberty.
I. AN EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEM
The 1973 and 1974 Terms have witnessed a restructuring of
the theoretical underpinnings of the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule made binding on the states in Mapp v. Ohio.'3 The
Mapp majority justified the exclusionary rule as a fourth amend-
ment remedy on a number of grounds,'4 but ultimately held the
rule binding upon the states because it was "an essential part of
the right to privacy" protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 5 Why the rule is "an essential part" of
that right has, however, never been made clear,'6 and with in-
creasing frequency individual Justices have come to characterize
the rule as simply a matter of remedial detail.17 Their view, if
accepted, raises important questions about the Court's power to
require state courts to recognize the exclusionary rule since state
courts generally enjoy wide discretion in fashioning the remedial
consequences of even federal primary rights. 8 On the other
hand, substantive constitutional guarantees can have important
remedial dimensions,"9 and it seems clear that state courts must,
1a367 U.S. 643 (ig6i).
14 These included: deterrence of violations of the fourth amendment, particu-
larly by federal agents who might turn tainted evidence over to state authorities
for use in state trials, id. at 658; prevention of the introduction of certain types
of evidence where introduction was "tantamount" to a coerced confession, id. at
656; preservation of judicial integrity, id. at 659; ensuring enjoyment of the
fourth amendment right of privacy, id. at 655-56.
15See id. at 655-56.
16 Commentators have, however, attempted to fill the gap. See, e.g., Schrock
& Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Require-
ment, 59 MiNN. L. REv. 251, 309 (I974). See also White, The Fourth Amendment
as a Way of Talking About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974
S. CT. REV. I65, 212-214.
17 See pp. 4-5 infra.
18See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HAgv. L. REv. 518,
547-5I (970).
1See id. See also Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2,97, 2206 (1975) ("In such
1975]
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in the exercise of their general jurisdiction, provide remedies
thought "indispensable" to the underlying guarantee.2 While
the Mapp majority may have held the exclusionary rule to be
an indispensable remedial aspect of the fourth amendment, the
Court's decisions in the last two Terms have cut the exclusionary
rule entirely free from any personal right or necessary remedy
approach, thereby removing the clearest authority for imposing
the rule on the states.
United States v. Calandra 21 is the watershed. There the
Court held that a witness could not resist a federal grand jury
interrogation on the ground that the questions asked were based
upon information resulting from a prior unlawful search and
seizure. The use of improperly seized materials as a basis for
questioning, said the Court, was not an "independent govern-
mental invasion of one's [Fourth Amendment rights, and]
work[ed] no new Fourth Amendment wrong." 22 Accordingly,
whether that use "should be proscribed presents a question, not
of rights, but of remedies." 23 "In sum," wrote Justice Powell
for the Court, "the rule is a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of
the party aggrieved." 24
United States v. Peltier,25 decided at the end of the 1974
Term, solidified the doctrinal shift. Nominally, the issue was
whether the fourth amendment border search doctrine announced
in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 2 should be applied retro-
actively to exclude evidence previously seized in "good faith."
But the Court's opinion addressed larger concerns, for it began
instances, the Court has found, in effect, that the constitutional [provision] implies
a right of action in the plaintiff."), noted pp. 189-95 infra.
20See Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLum. L. REv. xxop, I114-x6 (1969).
Most defenders of the exclusionary rule view the question whether the remedy is
an indispensable one in "legal" not factual terms. See, e.g., Dellinger, Of Rights
and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L. REv. X532, 1537-43
(1972) ; Schrock & Welsh, supra note 16. See also Critique, On the Limitations oj
Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Re-
search and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. Rv. 740 (1974) (reviewing
and criticizing the literature on the exclusionary rule's lack of actual deterrent
effect).
21 44 U.S. 338 (I974).
2 1 d. at 354.
23 Id.
41Id. at 348 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). See also LaFave, "Case-by-
Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma,
1974 S. CT. REv. i27, 157.
25 95 S. Ct. 2313 (1975).
26413 U.S. 266 (x973) (warrantless search of automobile 25 miles within
United States borders is violation of fourth amendment).
[Vol. 89: 1
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by noting that the retroactivity cases 27 "tell us a great deal
about the nature of the exclusionary rule" itself.28 Relying upon
Calandra for the proposition that no personal right was at stake,29
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said that the exclu-
sionary rule should be required only when the underlying policy
of deterrence would be furthered, or when required by the often
invoked "imperative of judicial integrity." 30
The core of this judicial "clean hands" doctrine is hard to
pin down; it seems to assert that the judge who does not exer-
cise his authority to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence
from his court becomes a "partner in wrongdoing" with the po-
liceman who obtained the evidence.3' While the imperative has
great rhetorical and even greater mystical appeal, its intellectual
underpinning is hardly self-evident. Taken by itself, it has occa-
sioned much scholarly discussion 12 and more confusion. Though
others may disagree, I think that the imperative cannot readily
be squared with the political assumptions underlying the Consti-
tution - particularly the doctrines of separation of power within
the federal government and of "federalism" as between the fed-
eral and state courts.3 3 It seems to me that the limited distribu-
tions of authority to the several units of government entail corre-
sponding limits on the responsibility of each independent unit of
27 See generally G. GuNTHER, supra note 4, at 546-47.
28 95 S. Ct. at 2317.
2 See id. at 2318.
3 0 1d.
" See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. X, X2-13 (1968) ("Courts which sit under our
Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the con-
stitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the
fruits of such invasions."). One interesting question is whether there is a similar
"imperative" for administrative and executive agencies which "sit under our Con-
stitution." See the materials cited in note 32 infra.
"2 Compare Note, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for
Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1129 (1973),
with Schrock & Welsh, supra note i6, at 263-71.
3 Much existing case law is inconsistent with the judicial integrity rationale.
Taken seriously, the rationale implies that courts have the power, perhaps even the
duty, to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence apart from objection by the de-
fendant, or even over his assent to its introduction - a position which, so far,as I
am aware, no court of last resort has taken. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S.
443 (1965) (evidence could be admitted if defendant had knowingly waived his
right to object). It would also seem to require both the abandonment of standing
limitations on who may object to the use of illegally seized evidence, see Kaplan,
The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. RV. 1027, 1030 (1974); Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cni. L. REV. 665,
734 (97o), and the abatement of judicial proceedings if the defendant's body
were unconstitutionally seized, a position the Court went out of its way to deny
last Term, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (975). See also United States
v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971)
(exclusionary rule does not apply to sentencing).
1975]
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government for the activities of others,34 and more specifically,
limits with respect to the Court's concern with the conduct of
independent federal and state law enforcement officials, to say
nothing of the integrity of state courts. 5 The underpinning of
the "imperative of judicial integrity" rationale need not detain
us further, however, for Peltier resurrected that rationale in form
only; on analysis, said the Court, it "does not differ markedly
from . .. the deterrence rationale .... ,, 36
In Peltier, two dissenting Justices lamented that the major-
ity's emphasis on the deterrence rationale foreshadowed a modi-
fication of the form of the exclusionary rule.3 7 In my view, how-
ever, it is not just one form of the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule that is threatened by the shift to the deterrence rationale,
but the very legitimacy of the rule itself, in whatever form it
takes. As a matter of traditional constitutional theory, 8 the
significant issue is whether the Supreme Court has the authority
to mandate the exclusionary rule if the rule is not a necessary
corollary of a constitutional right. To put the issue most strongly,
suppose a state legislature 39 has created a right of action for the
recovery of substantial stipulated damages simply upon a show-
ing that a police officer has violated a person's constitutional
rights.40 On review of a criminal conviction based on evidence
clearly obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, the high-
est court of the state refuses to exclude the evidence, giving the
" See PP. 34-35 infra; note 39 infra.
" For this reason I find difficult cases like Rochin v. California, 347 U.S. 165
(1952). See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 683 (ig6i) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(on review of state criminal conviction only federal question is whether defendant
received a fair trial).
36 95 S. Ct. at 2318.
37 95 S. Ct. at 2324-26 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
3 By this I mean the classic Marbury model in which constitutional issues
are decided as part of the process of litigating private rights. See generally
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1365-68 (I973).
" The same issue could be raised on the federal level. It is well settled that,
where the government seeks to use a federal court to enforce its orders, that court
has both the power and the obligation to assess the constitutionality of that order.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, X77 (18o3). See generally P.
BATOR, P. MIsHxiN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 336-38 (2d ed. 1973) (the "Dialogue")
[hereinafter cited as HART & WEcHsLER]. However, a separation of powers ques-
tion is raised if a federal enforcement court nullifies an order on subconstitutional
"common law" grounds. See pp. 34-35 infra.
'o See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (X97o) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); cf. 42 U.S.C. § x983
(1970) (similar right of action for violations of fourteenth amendment).
[Vol. 89:1I
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following opinion:
Defendant argues that he has a constitutional right to
have evidence seized in violation of the fourth amend-
ment excluded from his trial. If introduction of such evi-
dence constituted an independent constitutional violation,
we would not hesitate to require its exclusion. But United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (i974), and United
States v. Peltier, 95 S. Ct. 2312 (1975), establish that
defendant's personal rights are not implicated by admis-
sion of this evidence. See 414 U.S. at 348; 95 S. Ct. at
2318. Furthermore, introduction of this evidence does not
violate due process because the "truth finding function" of
the trial, 95 S. Ct. at 2316, is not impaired. See 95 S. Ct.
at 2316-18.
Defendant argues in the alternative that exclusion is
the only proper remedy for the initial violation of his
fourth amendment rights since the statutory damage rem-
edy does not prevent the government from benefiting from
its wrong. If failure to apply the exclusionary rule left the
defendant without any remedy, see Ward v. Love County,
253 U.S. 17 (1920), or left defendant's constitutional
rights "so wanting of a remedy as to render [them] a mere
'form of words,'" Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718, 722-
23 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1970), quoting
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (I96I), then the rem-
edy defendant seeks would quite arguably be constitution-
ally mandated. But where, as here, the legislature with
the clear intent of removing the exclusionary rule has
provided an alternative procedure with a remedy clearly
more than a mere form of words, we are bound by its
choice. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944);
Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968).
Nor is exclusion required even if it is assumed that the
states are under a general obligation to provide mechan-
isms to deter future violations of fourth amendment rights,
and that deterrence might be enhanced if this evidence
were excluded. This defendant has no future interest in
deterrence distinct from that of any other member of the
public. Plainly, defendant could not obtain an injunction
against future police misconduct based upon a single, past,
isolated instance of wrongdoing. Compare O'Shea v. Lit-
tleton, 414 U.S. 488 (I974), with Allee v. Medrano, 416
U.S. 802 (1974). This case is in principle no different
since defendant relies on unspecified future violations of
19751
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the fourth amendment to justify imposition of the exclu-
sionary rule. He is, in either context, asserting that he
must be recognized as a private attorney general, protect-
ing the fourth amendment rights of the public at large.
Even if the Supreme Court would take a different view of
the effectiveness of this state's statutory scheme, it has no
general supervisory power over the state courts. Murphy
v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 2035 (i975). See also Marshall v.
United States, 36o U.S. 30, 313 (I959). Moreover,
nothing in the text of the Constitution gives the Supreme
Court authority to require the states to permit a criminal
defendant to act as a private attorney general. Cf. Brown
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (i973) ("Fourth Amend-
ment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be
vicariously asserted.").
On review of this opinion, can the Supreme Court insist upon
exclusion of the evidence?
The Court's authority to do so is not evident. The central
issue here is the adequacy of the state ground asserted - whether
the states may choose not to recognize standing to raise specula-
tive future violations of third-party rights,4 or alternatively,
the extent to which the states may choose the remedies they will
give for violations of the Constitution. Since the defendant's
own constitutional rights are not cut off by application of the
state law, the only disagreement between the Supreme Court and
the state court is over the adequacy of a carefully structured
state money damage remedy to deter future violations of the
fourth amendment. However this disagreement might be resolved,
it is clear that the dispute is over a subconstitutional policy issue
that turns largely on an evaluation of debatable legislative facts,
namely, the most effective way to deter police misconduct. Even
if the fourth amendment imposes a general obligation on the state
to deter future fourth amendment violations, there appears to be
no basis for the Court to interpose its judgment to void what
is, after all, an attempt by the state legislature to provide a spe-
cific system for control of state officers.42
41 When no personal constitutional right is involved, standing to assert rights
in a state court is normally a matter of state law, see G. GuNTHER, supra note 4,
at 1572, and there would seem to be a strong state interest in the hypothetical
case here in refusing standing to assert the speculative rights of third parties,
namely the interest in public safety. Thus the criteria for adequate state pro-
cedural grounds announced in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965),
appear to he met.4
1See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945) (recognition of adequate
state grounds required by "partitioning of power between the state and federal
judicial systems"); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (0938) ("Except in
[Vol. 89:x
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The Supreme Court has not explicitly considered why, in the
face of these objections, it may insist upon application of the
exclusionary rule in state cases. Nor have the commentators.
Most writers view the Court's authority to fashion remedial rules
admittedly not required by the Constitution as virtually self-
evident.4 3 But I do not see why. Under Calandra and Peltier,
the exclusionary rule implicates no personal rights of the defen-
dant. The rule is simply a remedy to vindicate general fourth
amendment values. But, given these decisions, it must be as-
sumed that the Constitution requires no more of the states than,
in Professor Kaplan's words, "something that works - presum-
ably at a reasonable cost." 11 If so, why is the Court not limited
to a case-by-case determination of whether the state has pro-
vided that something?. '5
More importantly, these cases suggest still another question:
To what extent can the Court insist upon adherence to constitu-
tionally inspired, but not compelled, rules without considering as.
decisive whether the state has provided minimally satisfactory
alternatives? Can the Court, in other words, create a sub-order
of "quasi-constitutional" law - of a remedial, substantive, and
procedural character - to vindicate constitutional liberties?
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to
be applied in any case is the law of the State."); Hart, The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 CoLumI. L. REV. 489, 497 (i954); Mishkin, Some
Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARv. L. REv. x682 (1974);
Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a
Revised Doctrine, 1965 S. CT. REv. 187, 188 & n.6.
The general point is this: In the federal courts, jurisdiction to decide a dispute
does not necessarily imply a coextensive authority to apply federal rules of deci-
sion. And implicit in our federal structure is the idea that "the states' views of
social policy in the areas of state competence," Mishkin, supra at 1686-87, create
the law to be applied absent a substantial reason for the judicial creation of federal
law, see id.; Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512, 1517-31
(2969), or a constitutional limitation. What, therefore, can be the justification for
requiring the fourth amendment exclusionary rule if there is no violation of the
fourth amendment in the criminal trial itself?
4' For example, Professor Kaplan is content to note the "quasi-constitutional"
character of Mapp's exclusionary rule, and then to argue that it should be re-
shaped. See Kaplan, supra note 33, at io3o.
4 4
1d.
4 At the most, the exclusionary rule can be rationalized only on the assump-
tion that the Court is saying to the states: Here is a practice that, for constitu-
tional purposes, "will work," but you are now free to come up with an alternative.
Calandra and Peltier portend such a rationalization, thereby assimilating the
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule to the "alternative methods" for preventing
coerced confessions which the Court invited Congress and the states to develop
and adopt in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). But even if the
rules are so conceptualized, consideration should be given to the source of federal
judicial authority to impose them.
1975]
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If the Supreme Court is not mistaken in its insistence on the
application of the exclusionary rule in state cases - and it seems
too late in the day to conclude that it is - I think we are driven
to conclude that the Court has a common law power. This con-
clusion raises the central question of how constitutional common
law is to be reconciled with traditional constitutional theory and
particularly the limits put by federalism and the separation of
powers on the authority of the federal courts to create their own
rules of decision.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW AS A SPECIES OF
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
A. Federal Common Law in Areas of Plenary
National Legislative Authority
Considerations of the allocation of power in a federal system,
which led Justice Brandeis to conclude in Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins 46 that there is "no federal general common law," 4' have
not prevented the development by the federal courts of what
Judge Friendly has aptly termed a "specialized" federal common
law.4" Unlike the general law of Swift v. Tyson,49 this specialized
federal common law binds the state courts through the supremacy
clause,50 and provides a basis for review in the Supreme Court
on writs of certiorari." Like the common law of the states, the
46304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4 Id. at 78. In a case decided the same day, Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 1X0 (1938), Justice Brandeis held that there
was a federal common law of interstate water disputes.
4 Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 405 (1964). See generally Note, The Federal Common Law,
supra note 42; Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of
Decision, 77 HARv. L. Rsv. io84 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Federal Competence].
4941 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (842). An issue decided in a state court, although it
would be decided as a matter of "general law" in a federal court, was not review-
able on writ of error by the Supreme Court since the state determination provided
an "adequate state ground" for the decision. See Hart, supra note 42, at 504-05.
"OSee, e.g., Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04
(1962) (federal law of collective bargaining contracts declared in suits brought
under jurisdictional grant of Labor-Management Relations Act § 301(a) held
binding on state courts); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (law of interstate water disputes binding on states) ;
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 39, at 818-ig (admiralty); Hill, The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 2024,
1073-74 (z967).
51 This precise question appears never to have been decided. See Hill, supra
note 5o, at 1073, 1076 n.247. However, certiorari was granted in both Teamsters
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federal common law is a law of first resort,52 subject to revision
by subsequent legislation. 53
Specialized federal common law exists despite the fact that
the allocation of lawmaking competence in our federal system
imposes severe limits on the federal judicial authority to displace
state law. 4 The -limited powers of the national government were,
with some exceptions, granted to Congress, ordinarily leaving to
its discretion- and not the courts'- the decision of whether
and how these powers were to be exercised.55 Moreover, national
powers are interstitial powers, exercised "against the background
of the total corpus juris of the states . . . ., When exercised,
they may therefore alter or reverse preexisting state policy. 7
Thus, when a federal court announces a federal rule of decision
in an area of plenary congressional competence, it exercises an
initiative normally left to Congress, ousts state law, and yet acts
without the political checks on national power created by state
representation in Congress.
8
Because there is both residual and concurrent lawmaking
power in the states, 9 "[f] ederal intervention has been thought of
as requiring special justification, and the decision that such justi-
fication has been shown, being essentially discretionary, has be-
longed in most cases to Congress." o Erie fully reflects that
perception. It recognizes that federal judicial power to displace
state law is not coextensive with the scope of dormant congres-
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), and Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (938), where the only federal law
involved was federal common law.
12 See generally H.M. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 'PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 366-68 (tent. ed. 1958) [hereinafter
cited as HART & SACKS].
5' Indeed, in admiralty the power of Congress to amend the general maritime
law was implied not from article I, § 8, but from the article III grant of juris-
diction to the federal courts to hear admiralty cases. See Note, From Judicial
Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67
HARv. L. REv. 1214, 1234-35 (1954). Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized
that Congress might also determine rules of decision for interstate disputes even
though the Constitution provides only that the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction over such matters. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,
107 (1972).
54 See generally Mishkin, supra note 42.
" Note, Federal Competence, supra note 48, at io85.
5 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 39, at 471.
57 See Note, Federal Competence, supra note 48, at 1085.
"8 See Mishkin, supra note 42, at 1685-86. See generally Wechsler, The Po-
litical Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 543 (I954).
59 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 39, at 470-71.
e Hart, supra note 42, at 497.
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sional power."' Rather, the Court must point to some source,
such as a statute, treaty, or constitutional provision, as authority
for the creation of substantive federal law.
2
Since judicial power to create federal common law admittedly
exists where authorized by statute, concern usually centers upon
the appropriate criteria for determining whether federal common
law is to be fashioned when a congressional determination to
displace state law is a possible, but not unmistakable construc-
tion. Although the cases are somewhat ad hoc-reflecting a
crazy-quilt pattern of statutory,63 constitutional,64 and pragmat-
ic 65 considerations- the analysis is usually framed in terms of
whether the congressional purpose embodied in, or indicated by,
a statute requires state law to be subordinated. 6 Congressional
purpose is divined by the normal common law techniques of look-
ing to the words of the statute, the problem it was meant to solve,
the legislative history, the structure of the statute, its place among
other federal statutes, and the need for a uniform national rule
of law. Where the inquiry indicates that application of state
law would frustrate congressional policy, state law is subordi-
nated. This is the usual mode of preemption analysis.68 The
more difficult question is the propriety of developing federal com-
mon law in circumstances where no substantial conflict between
federal and state law is readily apparent 6 - especially where
61 See Mishkin, supra note 42, at 1683; Note, Federal Competence, supra note
48, at io85-86.
62See Mishkin, supra note 42, at 1685-88; Note, Federal Competence, supra
note 48, at IO85-86.
63See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (x957) (power
based on grant of jurisdiction in Labor-Management Relations Act § 301 (a) plus
federal intere'st in labor law).
64 See pp. 13-17 & notes 73-75 infra.
65 One of the most frequently cited reasons for creating a federal rule of deci-
sion is the need for national uniformity. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). The need for uniformity, however, is generally
not so much analyzed as merely asserted. See generally Note, The Federal Com-
mon Law, supra note 42, at 1529-31.
66 See generally Note, The Federal Common Law, supra note 42.
6 See HART & SACKS, supra note 52, at 1410-17; Note, The Federal Common
Law, supra note 42, at 1526-31; Note, Federal Competence, supra note 48, at
IO89-94.
6 As Professor David Currie observes:
Although the Court has not always said so, it seems proper to say that the
question in [preemption] cases is the familiar choice-of-law problem of
accommodating conflicting governmental interests: Does the purpose of the
federal law require subordination of state policy?
D. CumaE, FEDERAL CouRTs 887 (2d ed. z975). Most recent Supreme Court deci-
sions follow the choice-of-law approach. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine:
Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 CoLu2. L. REv.
623, 639-53 (,975).69The close relationship between preemption principles and federal common
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the principal reason for creating a federal law is a postulated
need for national uniformity.70
The Constitution is no less susceptible to interpretation
through a consideration of its text, structure and purposes than
are statutes.71 There is accordingly no a priori reason to suppose
that it should differ from statutes in providing a basis for the gen-
eration of federal common law.72  Indeed, it is well known that
an extensive common law has been built on the constitutional
grants of jurisdiction to hear cases in admiralty 73 and those in-
law, see, e.g., D. CuRuuz, supra note 68, at 886; HART & WECHSLER, supra note
39, at 8oo-o6, has not been adequately discussed by the Court. Arguably, am-
biguous federal statutes should have a displacing impact only when state law is
seen to be in material conflict with the policies of federal law. This would establish
state law as a norm operative until clearly incompatible with the policies of federal
law. While this approach seems'very much in keeping with the philosophy of the
Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (19 7o), it finds only occasional support
in the case law. See, e.g., Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,
68-69 (x966). See also Note, The Federal Common Law, supra note 42, at 1519.
Federal courts have developed federal common law on a basis which to my mind
would not have been justified under a strict preemption analysis. See generally
D. CuRau, supra, at 869-904; HART & WECHSLER, supra, at 756-832. See also
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (i973).
7Cases relying on uniformity have generally not given a principled analysis
of peculiar uniformity needs which would offset the central thrust of Erie. Why,
for example, is it necessary for the negotiable paper of the United States to be
governed by a uniform law, see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (X943), when General Motors and IBM are remitted to the laws of the sev-
eral states? If the issue is a matter of the mere inconvenience of responding to
differing state laws when a substantial number of transactions are made, then it
seems difficult to distinguish these cases. See Friendly, supra note 48, at 410-11
(criticizing Clearlield's uniformity rationale).
" See generally P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEcIsioNmAKING,
pt. I, at 1-435 (i975).
72 See Dellinger, supra note 2o, at 2549. Professor Black admonishes us that
our constitutional tradition focuses too much on textual analysis. See C. BLAcr,
STRUCTURE AND RELATNSioxsni f CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 3-7 (1969). More explicit
attention, he argues, should be given to "the method of inference from the struc-
tures and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some
principal part." Id. at 7. Indeed, an argument from structure appears to be de-
terminative of the authority of the Court to create its own rules of decision in
interstate disputes, see p. 14 infra; Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,
io5 n.6 (1973) ("basic interests of federalism"), in foreign relations law, see
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-24 (1964), and in ad-
miralty law, see D. Cuiua, supra note 68, at 814-r6. See also C. BLACK, supra
at 8-23 (demonstrating that, more frequently than supposed, considerations of
"structure and relationship" are controlling, not the text nominally invoked). One
might observe of this mode of analysis, however, that the traditional method of
"interpreting" textual provisions is hardly inconsistent with taking into account
structural considerations. The former are often simply the textual embodiment of
the latter.
7 See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 381-4o3
(X970); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 385-90 (1924); Currie, Federal-
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volving disputes among the states 71 or implicating foreign rela-
tions.75
The interstate dispute cases present a good example of au-
thority to create federal common law gleaned by implication from
the federal structure of the United States. Some tribunal must
exist for settling interstate controversies; but it is a basic pre-
sumption of the Constitution that the state courts may be too
parochial to administer fairly disputes in which important state
interests are at issue.76 Nor does it seem appropriate to restrict
the choice of controlling substantive law to that of one of the
contending states.7  An acceptable accommodation of interstate,
to say nothing of national, interests in a given dispute dictates
that the Supreme Court must possess power to fashion substantive
law not tied to that of any particular state. Thus the authority
to create federal common law springs of necessity from the struc-
ture of the Constitution, from its basic division of authority be-
tween the national government and the states.78
ism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," i96o S. CT. REV. 158, 162-63,
165-67.
"4 E.g., Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (974); Texas v. New Jersey,
379 U.S. 674, 677 (i965); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92, 11o (x938); Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U.S. 46, 98 (19o7); Note,
The Federal Common Law, supra note 42, at 1520.
"
2 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964).
The Supreme Court has requested counsel in Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d
1355 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (974), restored for reargument, 95 S. Ct. 2624
(i975), to brief and argue whether the specific holding of Sabbatino should be
overruled. See 95 S. Ct. at 2624.
Professor Hill views the foregoing areas of federal common law as zones carved
out by the Constitution from the reach of state power. See Hill, supra note 5o,
at io3o-35, 1042-49. That view has been criticized. See Mishkin, supra note 42,
at 1683 n.9; Note, The Federal Common Law, supra note 42, at 1516-17. The
difficulty with Hill's zone preemption is that all constitutional restrictions "pre-
empt" state law, at least in a limited sense. In practice, we restrict use of the
term "preemption" in constitutional cases, largely, I suspect, because "preemption"
denotes conflict of a more subtle and indirect order and we tend to assume that
unconstitutionality is relatively "clear cut." But differences in usage aside, the
fact remains that "conflict is the touchstone of pre-emption," San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 250 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See also Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1971). Ac-
cordingly, the usual mode of preemption analysis is not to carve out a priori
zones of preemption but to consider the specific impact of state law upon federal
policy. See note 69 supra.
7 6 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (i Wheat.) 304, 346-47 (1816).
" See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,
110 (1938).
8 The Court has declined to fashion a substantive common law for multistate
transactions between private parties, binding on both federal and state courts.
See generally Von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems:
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Without carefully evaluating any of the traditional enclaves
of federal common law, I would observe that one of the most
salient illustrations of the Supreme Court's derivation of federal
rules of decision from the Constitution has gone insufficiently
recognized- the invalidation of state statutes because of in-
consistency with the negative implication of the grant to Con-
gress of power "[t] o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States." " The commerce clause is framed simply as a grant of
authority to Congress, and judges of the stature of Chief Justice
Taney 80 have denied that it authorized judicial displacement of
state law. While time has settled the question the other way,"'
the supporting rationalizations leave much to be desired. Nu-
merous decisions indicate that the clause "itself" displaces state
regulations inconsistent with its free trade policy. 2 But this
explanation raises serious problems given the "finality" aspect of
Marbury, for the Court has repeatedly recognized congressional
power to overrule judicial judgments in this area."3 How is such
a result possible if the Court is, in fact, interpreting the Consti-
tution "itself"? 8
I do not think this problem can be papered over with the
appealing and frequently voiced suggestion that congressional
revision in commerce clause cases is simply the result of a dif-
ferent congressional evaluation of facts."5 That explanation will
Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88
HARv. L. REV. 347 (1974). Nor has the Court federalized the choice of law process
in the context of multistate disputes. See R. CRAMTON, D. CuRRI & H. KAY,
CoNrmicT or LAws 403-45 (1975).
7" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Questions of "negative impact" are, of course,
not limited to the commerce clause. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
436-41 (1968) (state regulation of foreign affairs).
80 See his opinions in The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 5 73-85 (1847),
and The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 464-94 (1849) (Taney, C.J.,
dissenting).
"' The watershed decision was, of course, Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). See generally F. FRANxXcURTER, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 12-29, 55-58 (1937); F. RIBBLE,
STATE AND NATONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE 21-85 (1937).
82 E.g., Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (974); Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
83 See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
"4The problem is an important one. To hold on the basis of Marbury that
Congress could not overrule the Court's judgment would have converted the
commerce clause-a grant of power to Congress-into a partial limitation upon
that body, see id. at 421-27, 430-33, requiring Congress to achieve some uniformity
where it may have preferred diversity. The net result would be to transfer ulti-
mate control over some aspects of national commerce from Congress to the federal
courts.
85E.g., id. at 425 n.32 ("[ln some instances conceivably the reversal might
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not suffice for two reasons. First, some of the cases involve "rules
of law" as that term is generally understood. This is certainly
true of the decisions condemning as per se violations "discrimina-
tory" state taxation and regulation designed to protect in-state
economic interests." Second, there is still the initial premise that
the clause has some negative impact, a "legal" determination
which, I assume, Congress could wholly suspend.
Another proffered explanation would assimilate commerce
clause questions to statutory, rather than constitutional, con-
struction. The argument is that the Court interprets not the
Constitution, but congressional "silence." 87 Accordingly, should
the Court mistake the meaning of that silence, Congress simply
sets the matter right.8 This "negative legislation" theory 11 may
remove difficulties stemming from Marbury, but it presents for-
midable constitutional problems of its own. The Constitution,
after -all, expressly prescribes the process by which legislation is
to be enacted, and it is one which requires both affirmative con-
gressional action and a role for the President." It is difficult to
see how legislation by silence 11 can be squared with this con-
stitutionally prescribed process. The Constitution aside, there are
other difficulties. A "silently vocal" Congress is a high fiction as
Professor Powell has acidly observed.92 More importantly, to
be rationalized as only one of factual judgment .... "). The Court in Prudential
itself rejected this rationale. See id. at 425-26.
" Since Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876), the Court has condemned,
without considering factual justification, taxes that are facially discriminatory
against interstate commerce as well as statutes that pose a great risk of dis-
crimination. In addition, the Court continues to hold invalid per se discriminatory
state regulations designed to protect local economic interests. See, e.g., Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 144-46 (1970); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery
Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 373-75 (1964). See generally Note, State Environ-
mental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1762,
1772-75 (,974). It is no answer to say that these rules rest, in turn, upon some
generalized factual assumptions. All rules do, but that does not prevent the rules
from operating as "rules."
8 See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 9X U.S. 275, 282 (1876) ; Sholley, The Negative
Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. Ca. L. REV. 556, 583-88 (1936).
But see id. at 593-94 (author concludes that Court should weigh competing
policies).
88 The Court has referred to this thesis without commitment. See, e.g., Pru-
dential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 421-25 (i946).
8 United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 95 S. Ct. I7O8, I714-x5 n:14 (1975).9 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
"1 See HART & SACKs, supra note 52, at 1394-97. See also Train v. City of
New York, 420 U.S. 35, 45 (i975) ("[Legislative intention, without more, is not
legislation.") ; HART & SACKS, supra at X225. This is not to deny that congressional
silence may have some relevance to the construction of existing statutes.
92
Now congress has a wonderful power that only judges and lawyers know
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attribute affirmative legislative policy to legislative inaction is
seldom, if ever, justified, as both commentators 9 and the Court 94
have recognized.
To my mind, the most satisfactory explanation of the com-
merce clause cases is that the Supreme Court is fashioning federal
common law on the authority of the commerce clause. That
clause embodies a national, free-trade philosophy which can be
read as requiring the Court, in limited circumstances, to displace
state-created trade barriers. I suspect that the failure so to view
the negative-impact commerce clause cases is largely because the
sanction of nullity for violation of the free-trade policy is the
same as under a Marbury-like invalidation and does not "look
like" the affirmative creation of federal regulatory rules. The
Court, undoubtedly constrained by traditional limitations on the
remedial powers of courts, has simply assumed that freeing the
particular business from the challenged state regulation ade-
quately advances the dominant federal free-trade policy. More
often than may be appreciated, however, the negative-impact
cases result in the subordination of the law of one state to that
of another,95 even if they do not go quite to the extent, as Pro-
fessor Horowitz suggests, of permitting the Court to "choose the
governing law that would best facilitate multistate commercial
transactions." 96 In any event, I do not see why the Court is not
making constitutionally inspired common law. The ultimate
source of judicial lawmaking authority is the constitutional text;
and like the admiralty, interstate' boundary, and foreign affairs
cases, the negative-impact cases are wholly subject to congres-
sional revision.9
7
about. Congress has a power to keep silent. Congress can regulate inter-
state commece just by not doing anything about it. Of course when con-
gress keeps silent, it takes an expert to know what it means. But the judges
are experts. They say that congress by keeping silent sometimes means that
it is keeping silent and sometimes means that it is speaking. If congress
keeps silent about the interstate commerce that is not national in character
and that may just as well be regulated by the states, then congress is silently
silent, and the states may regulate. But if congress keeps silent about the
kind of commerce that is national in character and ought to be regulated
only by congress, then congress is silently vocal and says that the commerce
must be free from state regulation.
Powell, The Still Small Voice of the Commerce Clause, in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ow
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 931, 932 (1938).
" See HART & SACKS, supra note 52, at 1394-1401; Mishkin, supra note 42, at
1687-88.
"' See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 6i, 78 (,974). See also sources cited
in HART & SACKS, supra note 52, at 1381-I40x.
" This was the result in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959).
9 Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law
Doctrine, 84 HAv. L. Rxv. 8o6, 814 (197).
17 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). Two exceptions may
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B. A Federal Common Law of Civil Liberties
All of the foregoing "constitutional common law" cases in-
volve situations where state interests are ultimately subordinate
to plenary national legislative power. Therefore, they do not by
themselves establish that the Court may fashion common law
rules protecting civil liberties because such a rulemaking author-
ity-which seeks to create federal rules in areas of primary
state concern- intersects with federalism concerns in a different
way. But neither do they indicate that it would be improper to
look to the constitutional guarantees of individual liberties as
authorizing the creation of a common law substructure to carry
out the purposes and policies of those guaranteesY5 Indeed, as
we shall see,9" the Court's traditional role in defining the con-
stitutionally permissible scope of both state and federal power
may make judicial creation of a constitutional common law of
individual liberties less open to objection than that in areas
committed to plenary national legislative power.
Protection of individual liberties has not been left to congres-
sional initiative, but has become the central function of tradi-
tional Marbury-style judicial review. Moreover, the traditional
deference of Congress to the Supreme Court in safeguarding indi-
vidual liberties makes it both less likely that Congress will act
affirmatively to implement the Bill of Rights, 100 and improbable
exist to the power of Congress to revise constitutionally based federal common
law. Several old decisions, e.g., Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219,
225-28 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164-65 (192o),
suggest limits on congressional power to revise the content of the maritime law,
but it is doubtful that those decisions would be followed today. See D. CURRIE,
supra note 68, at 897. Professor Hill argues that "a notable exception" to the
principle of congressional revision exists in interstate boundary disputes: "[T]here
is little if anything that Congress can do about the historic boundaries of states."
Hill, supra note 5o, at 1070; see id. at 107o n.214.
9 A majority of the Court has recognized that the specific constitutional guar-
antees in favor of individual liberty have accompanying "penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance," Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (z965). My suggestion is more modest-
a subconstitutional penumbral area formed by emanations from those guarantees.
9 See pp. 34-38 infra.
o
00 The Bill of Rights is, of course, framed simply as a limitation on congres-
sional power; however, most of its provisions have been made applicable to the
states through the first section of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-49 (1968). While § 5 of the fourteenth amendment
authorizes Congress "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article," this authorization of power rests on different principles than the plenary
congressional grants in article I, § 8. Section 5 is a limited, backstopping authority,
allowing the national government to correct state wrongs. The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 11-14 (1883), are surely right on that point even if they take too
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that congressional silence indicates a desire to retain state law.
More importantly, the affirmative case for recognizing a consti-
tutional common law of individual liberties is a strong one. The
Court's history and its institutional role in our scheme of govern-
ment, in which it defines the constitutionally compelled limits of
governmental power, make it a singularly appropriate institution
to fashion many of the details as well as the framework of the
constitutional guarantees.'' Finally, the desirability of some
such undertaking seems clear. As a general matter, it does not
appear appropriate that federally guaranteed rights, particularly
when their basis is constitutional, should have materially different
dimensions in each of the states when both the source of the right
and any ultimate interpretation is unitary. Given the limited and
important nature of the rights involved, I find unconvincing any
argument that a uniform common law of individual liberty would
undermine the values inherent in having fifty different labora-
tories for social experimentation.0 2 Rather, the constitutional
rights and their implementing components establish a nationwide
floor below which state experimentation will not be permitted to
fall. While these considerations may not compel a conclusion that
uniformity requires the creation of constitutional common law,
they appear to be at least as weighty as considerations of govern-
mental convenience which have justified a uniform federal law
in other contexts. 3
I also propose acceptance of the Supreme Court's power to
fashion constitutional common law because recognition of that
power is the most satisfactory way to rationalize a large and
steadily growing body of Court decisions. I fully recognize that
the Court does not usually proceed on the basis that it can review
state action other than in interpretative constitutional terms.
Having disposed of the constitutional limitation, the Court does
not next inquire whether some constitutionally based common
law rule should be formulated. Yet the case law, while not ex-
tensive and certainly not conclusive, is at least highly suggestive
of a sizable body of constitutionally inspired implementing rules
whose only sources are constitutional provisions framed as limi-
tations on government.
This can be seen in several decisions in the criminal procedure
narrow a view of the substantive reach of congressional power under the four-
teenth amendment.
101 See pp. 35-36 infra.
102 New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as'a laboratory ... .
103 See sources cited at note 7o supra.
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field. Both the Warren and Burger Courts have explicitly drawn
a line between the basic rights authoritatively declared to inhere
in the Constitution and the formulation of their specific and ad-
mittedly variable components. Miranda v. Arizona,'°4 for exam-
ple, did not claim immutable constitutional status for its famous
gloss on the privilege against self-incrimination- the prescribed
warnings. On the contrary, the Court repeatedly stressed its
willingness to accept alternative schemes which would achieve the
underlying policies of the constitutional guarantees. 1°5 Similarly,
when the Court prescribed "lineup" rules in 1967,1"' it took pains
to declare that those rules were required only in the absence
of other devices to protect the underlying constitutional right to
a fair trial. 0 7 The point of the rules set out in both of these
areas is to guide primary behavior 108 when existing procedures
have failed adequately to protect individual rights. 0 9
In both Miranda and the lineup cases, the Court was exer-
cising, in a constitutional context, a traditional judicial function
-protecting individual rights threatened in circumstances not
foreseen by statute 110 by providing guidance to primary actors
104 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'See id. at 467. Brown v. Illinois, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975), noted pp. 68-70
infra, makes plain that the Court views the warnings as simply a "prophylactic
rule," id. at 226o, designed to deter potential police overreaching. There is no
suggestion that these measures are deemed indispensable to the underlying privilege
against self-incrimination.
1 6 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967).
'
0  See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (I967). See also Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
108 Hart and Sacks have characterized primary behavior as "something which
[is] expect[ed] or hope~d] to happen when the arrangement works successfully."
See HART & SACKS, supra note 52, at 135. This is in contrast to the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule which, without defining precisely what a reasonable search
should be, defines the consequences of "noncompliance or other deviation," id.,
from the required behavior.
'09 In a sense, this is the point of the Calandra-Peltier exclusionary rule
too. See pp. 4-6 supra. But, unlike Miranda's prescribed warnings, the "com-
mand" to law enforcement officers is couched in constitutional terms, e.g., "don't
search and seize unreasonably," rather than in particularized terms, e.g., "it is
unreasonable to search a car without a warrant unless there is a chance that it
may be moved before a warrant can be obtained." The former command may not
be sufficiently specific to allow a law enforcement official to understand his duty
and therefore may not be as protective of individual liberties. See LaFave, supra
note 24, at 141-43 (emphasizing need for clarity in rules regulating police con-
duct) ; note iii infra.
1 0 See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co., 315 U.S. 447, 470
(1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Were we bereft of the common law, our federal
system would be impotent. This follows from the recognized futility of attempting
all-complete statutory codes, and is apparent from the terms of the Constitution
itself.) ; HART & SACKS, supra note 52, at 367-68.
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(law enforcement personnel in these cases) in terms sufficiently
specific to allow "self-applying regulation." "I Although the
function is a traditional one, that alone cannot explain the source
of Supreme Court authority to require that state courts adopt a
rule, rather than proceed to judge the fairness of the criminal
proceeding on a case-by-case basis. In particular, it does not
explain why the Court may insist upon, a particular form of a
rule among the several that might provide protection for the
underlying constitutional right." 2
A prophylactic rule might be constitutionally compelled when
it is necessary to overprotect a constitutional right because a
narrow, theoretically more discriminating rule may not work in
practice. This may happen where, for example, there is a sub-
stantial danger that a more finely tuned rule may be subverted
in its administration by unsympathetic courts, juries, or public
officials.1 3  But if the point of adopting a rule derives from
"' See HAnT & SACKS, supra note 52, at 132. "Self-applying regulation" is an
official directive "which is susceptible of correct and dispositive application by a
person to whom it is initially addressed . . . ." Id. at 133.
If official misbehavior is to be controlled, then two things seem necessary.
First, the official must be aware of what is required of him in sufficiently con-
crete terms that he may be able to comply. The generalized rules of interpretation
we generally associate with constitutional construction- such as, "the state must
provide a fair hearing"- will frequently be inadequate for such a task. Second,
the official must have some incentive to comply with the applicable rule. Thus,
if the Court is to protect individual liberties from official intrusions, a common
law both generating concrete rules of behavior and granting remedies is a neces-
sity. Yet neither the rule nor the remedy may be constitutionally compelled in
the sense that some other arrangement or remedy may also adequately guide
official behavior.
112 justice Harlan dissented in Chapman v. California on the express ground
that there is an absence of federal judicial power "to declare which of the many
admittedly constitutional alternatives a state may choose." 386 U.S. i8, 48 (1967).
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), affords yet another illustration
of the same troublesome questions. The Court there held that the fourteenth
amendment prohibits retaliatory sentencing upon the retrial and conviction of
state criminal defendants following their successful appeals. See also Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 24-29 (1974). But instead of proceeding on a case-by-case
basis, assessing the challenged state action against the constitutional right to be
free from punitive resentencing, the Court held that the basis for any higher sen-
tence must affirmatively appear in the record and must be the result of conduct
occurring after the first trial. 395 U.S. at 726. Surely, as the Court itself has
expressly recognized, see Michigan v. Payne, 422 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1973), these
implementing rules, like the Miranda warnings, go beyond what the Constitution
requires: They are prophylactic measures, regulations of implementing detail. But
if the prophylactic rules announced in these cases are not viewed as an integral
part of the underlying constitutional right, where is the authority of the Court
to require that state courts adopt a rule, rather than proceed on a case-by-case
basis, and a particular form of a rule among several arguably adequate ones?
113For example, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 316 U.S. 254 (1964), it
1975]
22 .D-Y.vA1L A- . I TV T Y2 Lu. 0 0.-
prudential considerations - such as showing the lower courts the
way to decide a spectrum of future cases, charting a reasonably
safe course of conduct for public officials to follow, or keeping
the Supreme Court out of the exceedingly difficult and unreward-
ing task of detailed factual analysis "' - then it is difficult to
understand why the adequate state ground doctrine does not
require the Court to assess the adequacy of state procedures on
a case-by-case basis."'
That the Miranda prophylactic rule approach is "better" than
the burdensome task of normal case-by-case adjudication may be
conceded. The question is whether the Court has the authority
to require such rules of the state courts where it is unwilling to
treat the prophylactic implementing rule as a necessary dimen-
sion of an underlying constitutional right."' The Court undoubt-
edly has both the power and the duty to fashion "interpretative"
implementing rules to fill out the meaning of generally framed
constitutional provisions. This is simply an ancient aspect of the
might be conceded that knowingly defamatory and false statements do not ma-
terially advance first amendment values. Even so, an absolute privilege might be
justified on the ground that any lesser protection would prove insufficient when
administered by unsympathetic juries. Indeed, experience seems to confirm this
fear, for much of the Court's work in administering the Times rules has been
directed to confining jury latitude to infer malice and award excessive damages.
See Monaghan, supra note 18, at 527-31. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), noted in The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REV.
41, 139 (1974). Similarly, even assuming that the first amendment excludes
"worthless" speech, protection of obscenity might be justified on the premise that
the administration of obscenity statutes presents excessive risks to protected
speech. See Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and
Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YArE L.J. 127, 134 (1966).
"
4 See H. WECHSLER, THE NATIONALIZATION oF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL
RIGHTs i8-i9 (1970):
[Tihere can be no doubt but that the administration of a standard of due
process calling for the closest scrutiny of records to appraise essential fair-
ness has proved to be increasingly intractable and burdensome, and to exert
too little impact on the grave abuse in our practice so frequently revealed
by the cases in the Court. The pressure to decree more rigid rules more
easily applied has grown accordingly apace.
See generally W. LOCKHART, Y. KAmISAR & J. CHOPER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION: CASES -COMMENTS -QUESTIONS 437-46 (3d ed. 1970). Of course, the
difficulties of a case-by-case approach are not limited to criminal procedure. See,
e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 162 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(criticizing Court's case-by-case approach in obscenity cases); Paris Adult The-
atre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same). See
also Carlson v. United States, 418 U.S. 924 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Monaghan, supra note 18, at 527-28.
"'See note 42 supra.
16Reference to the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, will not suffice.
That clause simply determines how a conflict between a state rule and a valid
federal rule is to be resolved. It does not purport to contain criteria for deter-
mining the initial question of the validity of the federal rule.
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judicial function in construing the meaning of any text - consti-
tutional, statutory, contractual, etc. 117 Thus a holding that the
constitutionally based freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures embraces electronic eavesdropping," 8 whether correct or
not on the merits, constitutes an interpretative filling-out of the
underlying constitutional guarantee. It is authoritative because
the rule is "part and parcel" of the underlying constitutional
guarantee. But, to borrow the language of administrative law,
does the Court also possess a power to fashion a substructure of
implementing "legislative" rules " -rules that are admittedly
not integral parts of the Constitution and that go beyond its
minimum requirements? If the Court possesses that power, what
is its source?
I suggest that such legislative rules can be adequately ration-
alized as constitutional common law. For example, the utility of
providing the police with guidance in the Miranda and lineup
situations so that they may understand (and presumably follow)
their duty with regard to individual liberties should be self-evi-
dent. Since the states and federal government have apparently
not taken steps to create a self-regulating regime, and since the
Court is necessarily involved in the definition of the dimensions
of the constitutional rights involved, 2' there seems little reason
for the Court not to prescribe rules sufficient to create self-regu-
lation. Furthermore, in the criminal context, a uniform national
definition of constitutional liberties seems particularly appro-
priate.
The functions of protection .of constitutionally recognized
rights and guidance of officials often recur in the constitutional
common law of individual liberties. In Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,"2' for exam-
ple, the Court recognized a right to damages against federal
officers who violate the fourth amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. By this decision, the Court
filled in an incomplete statutory framework that would have
117 "Implementation of the Bill of Rights does not differ from implementation
of other constitutional provisions, or indeed statutory provisions, insofar as it
involves, generally, the creation of a substructure of subsidiary rules . . . ." Hill,
The Bill oj Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 CoLum. L. REv. i8i, iS (x969).
1"' Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (i967).
11 9 K. DAvis, AmnimsTIRATIW LAW TExT 126-31 (3d ed. 1972). This is not
to suggest that the distinction between the two types of rules is absolute. See,
e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 2371-72 (i975), noted pp.
225-34 infra; L. JAFFF, JuDCicl. CONTROL OF ADmISTRATIE ACTION 406 (1965).
120 Since the Courts are being asked to enforce the criminal law, they have an
obligation to assess the constitutionality of the whole procedure. See note 39 supra.
121 403 U.S. 388, 390-97 (i971).
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authorized damages had the narcotics agents been state officers.122
The majority opinion apparently derives the right to damages
from the fourth amendment itself.' 23 But, unless the Court views
a damage action as an indispensable remedial dimension of the
underlying guarantee, 24 it is not constitutional interpretation,
but common law.125  The latter position commends itself since
this would be entirely analogous to the long recognized federal
common law process of articulating the remedial implications of
federal statutory rights. 26
The Court's ever-lengthening line of procedural due process
decisions, which, as Professor McCormack rightly observes, now
embrace "[a]lmost every point of contact between an individual
and government," 127 also invites analysis in common law terms.
To be sure, holdings that due process requires a "fair" hearing
in connection with such diverse proceedings as welfare ter-
mination, 12 8 automobile license suspension,'1 29 parole revocation
122See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
'
2 2 See 403 U.S. at 395-97.
124 The Court apparently did not so view the damage remedy:
Finally, we cannot accept respondents' formulation of the question as
whether the availability of money damages is necessary to enforce the
Fourth Amendment . . . . The question is merely whether petitioner, if he
can demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation by federal agents
of his Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled to redress his injury through a
particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts.
Id. at 397.
125 Hart and Wechsler suggest that Bivens is an illustration of judicial "im-
plication of federal remedies." HART & WECHsLER, supra note 39, at 798. See also
Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Dellinger, supra note 2o, at
1540-43. My own analysis is different. I think that Bivens is an explicit recogni-
tion that the constitutional guarantee embraces a right of action, see HART &
SACKs, supra note 52, at 153-55, which is enforceable by any appropriate remedy
including damages, in either the state or federal courts. If the ultimate footing of
judicial remedial lawmaking authority is article III's grant of "judicial power,"
see Dellinger, supra, at 1540-43, I doubt that the existence of a federal remedy
can have any consequence for the states. See pp. 3-4; Monaghan, supra note
18, at 524 n.23, 547-5I. In any event, it seems to me more realistic to focus on
the substantive statutory or constitutional provisions being implemented, for they
constitute the necessary points of reference for the exercise of any judicial power.
Moreover, reference to the substantive statutory or constitutional provision recog-
nizes that state courts too are obliged to formulate and apply federal common
law, subject to the ultimate control of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., A/S J. Ludwig
Mowinckels Rederi v. Dow Chemical Co., 25 N.Y.2d 576, 579-85, 255 N.E.2d 774,
775-79, 307 N.Y.S.2d 66o, 662-66, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (197o).12 8See, e.g., 3.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See generally HART
& WECHSLER, supra note 39, at 798-99.
127 McCormack, The Purpose of Due Process: Fair Hearing or Vehicle for
Judicial Review?, 52 TEXAs L. Rv. 1257, 1257 (0974).
12' Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (970).
129 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (97X).
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proceedings,'30  government employment termination, 3  prison
discipline, 32 school suspension,'33 and attachment '3' are intended
as authoritative interpretations of due process. The fair hearing
requirement is, accordingly, shielded by Marbury from revision
by ordinary political processes. But the specific and widely vary-
ing procedural components of the required hearings are less
evidently of a constitutional order of magnitude, even if one
makes every allowance for the proposition that what process is due
depends upon the context and nature of the interest involved.3 5
Judge Friendly has recently argued against interpreting every
procedural wrinkle required by the Supreme Court as one com-
pelled by due process. Noting the tendency to overjudicialize the
administrative process, particularly in areas of mass administra-
tive justice such as welfare,'3 6 he argues that '.7
[t]here is no constitutional mandate requiring use of the adver-
sary process in administrative hearings unless the Court chooses
to construct one out the vague contours of the due process clause.
But that clause does not forbid reasonable experimentation. For
a state to experiment with procedures for mass administrative
justice wholly different from those required in a felony trial
would be a splendid vindication of "one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory."
On his main point, I agree. There is no solid basis for con-
cluding that all of the specific components of the right to hearing
'
3
"Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
1"1 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
132 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (i974).
133 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), noted pp. 85-87 infra.
134 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (z969).
' The process of prescribing the specific components of due process forces the
Court to inquire into such matters as: in what circumstances may the prescribed
hearing follow, rather than precede, the challenged government action; when must
the hearing include confrontation and cross-examination or the right to counsel;
when must reasons be stated; and at what point is an impartial decisionmaker
required. See Friendly, supra note 8, at 1279-1304. Sometimes the Court has
avoided passing on these issues; sometimes not. See Note, Specifying the 'Pro-
cedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing,
88 HARv. L. REv. 15io, x517-I8 (1975). And sometimes the Court has provided
different answers in contexts which are not evidently dissimilar on grounds of
principle. See, e.g., Case Comment, Fear of Firing: Arnett v. Kennedy and the
Protection of Federal Career Employees, Io HARv. Civ. RiGH"S-Civ. LiB. L. REV.
472, 498 (,975).
138 Friendly, supra note 8, at 1269.




cases embody fundamental, immutable constitutional principles.
Rather,138
a considerable portion of the details of implementation consist
of minutiae below the threshold of constitutional concern ....
If details may vary from one jurisdiction to another, it is be-
cause they do not materially diminish the effectiveness of the
implementation that is constitutionally mandated.
Congressional alteration of any component would pose the same
question raised by Miranda and the lineup cases: does the net
result of the legislative change constitute an "adequate" substi-
tute for what the Court required?
But Judge Friendly's analysis overlooks a possibility. For
in the absence of congressional action, the twin goals of ensur-
ing adequate protection of constitutionally rooted interests and
of achieving self-regulating official behavior ' may make it de-
sirable for the Court itself to frame at least some part of the
appropriate procedures. The Court, in short, need not be con-
strained to the narrow determination of whether the particular
state procedures are "minimally adequate." The Court might,
instead, proceed on a frankly experimental basis in the hope of
achieving the "best" implementing rule on a cost-benefit analysis;
alternatively, it might fashion one acceptable procedural scheme
without necessarily rejecting all others. The resulting component
rules may reflect a blend of reason, analogy, experience, and pure
hunch. The important point is that the Court need not assume
that any particular rule is a necessary component of due process
to justify its imposition.
The previous examples seem to me to point to the existence
of a rather sizable body of constitutional common law. Taken
together, they remind me of the story of old Ezra who, when
asked if he believed in infant baptism, replied: "Believe in it?
Why, man, I've seen it done!"
C. The Role of Congress in a
Common Law of Civil Liberties
There is much in the Court's recent work that suggests the
emergence of a corpus of constitutionally inspired common law
protecting individual liberties. We have seen that the Supreme
Court is not without power to round out the edges of the clauses
limiting governmental power with rules - like the exclusionary
rule -which need not be viewed as of the same order of mag-
138 Hill, supra note iz7, at 191.
13O See note ixi supra.
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nitude as "true" constitutional interpretation. This new common
law of individual liberties is significant not only because it en-
ables the Court to act interstitially in protecting private rights,
but also because it provides the Court with a means for involving
Congress in the continuing process of defining the content and
consequences of individual liberties.
Conceivably, the Supreme Court could protect individual lib-
erties simply by announcing rules precisely the same as those
here chara~cterized as common law, but under the rubric of the
Constitution itself. That, of course, is the familiar model of con-
stitutional adjudication. But, as the development of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule suggests,1 40 detailed rules based in
significant measure upon debatable policy or factual determina-
tions are inevitably subject to pressures for change once the
weight of those policies or the underlying "legislative facts" are
seen to change.141 So long as the rules are thought to be consti-
tutional in character, however, pressures for change can be ac-
commodated only through an express overruling of prior doctrine,
or the whittling away of an original holding through spurious
"distinctions" 142 or through such devices as doctrines of waiv-
er, standing, and harmless error..43 None of these tactics is
without its institutional costs- both in terms of a break in the
continuity of constitutional doctrine and in a departure from the
norm of prihcipled adjudication.
Another danger is that the Court, sensitive to the dangers of
too much "temporary" constitutional law and the federalism im-
plications of prescribing detailed rules, will confine its activity
to a sanction of nullification with the hope that Congress will
subsequently fill the void with a constitutional statute that ade-
quately protects individual liberty.144 But when the problem is
140 See pp. 3-8 supra.
141 One of the side effects of grounding a decision in legislative facts may be
that others are stimulated to make empirical tests of facts apparently relied on by
the Court. Witness the empirical tests of the exclusionary rule as an element of
deterrence, e.g., Oaks, supra note 33; Spiotto, Search and Seisure: An Empirical
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 243
(1973); Critique, supra note 20, and of the Miranda warnings, e.g., Note, Inter-
rogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967). The
assumption underlying such studies is that the Court should respond to new evi-
dence as it is developed.
1"2 E.g., the "distinction" of Miranda in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(i97i), criticized in Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Ob-
servations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 8o YALE
L.J. x198, i2o8-2x (1971).
143 See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
14'Indeed, nullification of malapportioned districts through the device of
ordering at large elections has been urged as a way for a court to avoid resolving
the many difficult subconstitutional questions involved in drawing districts. See
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one to which Congress, for whatever reason, does not or cannot
respond with any immediacy, the net result will be that no au-
thoritative governmental organ gives determinate guidance to
government officials to prevent unjustifiable intrusions upon indi-
vidual liberties. 4 " If, however, the Supreme Court openly as-
sumed a common law role, there would be little need for any
judicial hesitance in prescribing interstitial rules. Pressures for
change could then be accommodated either by legislation or by
an open reconsideration of the subconstitutional policy concerns
underlying an initial formulation of a rule. In either case, it
would be unnecessary to reinterpret the Constitution.
14
Moreover, Supreme Court use of constitutional common law,
because it allows a coordinate role for Congress in protecting
constitutional liberties, should increase the likelihood that Con-
gress' special institutional competence will be brought to bear on
the problems of protecting individual liberty. Congress has, for
example, a special ability to develop and consider the factual
basis of a problem.147  More importantly, it has the ability to
Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. Xo57,
io87 (1958). "[T]he remedy of the election at large is simply a spur to legislative
action, not an end in itself. It would be so burdensome ... that redistricting
almost inevitably would result . . . ." Id. In the reapportionment cases, the
interim relief of an at large election is itself something of a remedy for a violation
of voting rights, but even so, its recognized drawbacks make it a tolerable short-
term expedient at best. See id.; cf. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 14-21 (0975)
(multi-member districting plan overturned).
.4. The history of the application of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
to the states, set out in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 65o-55 (i96z), illustrates
this problem. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (949), the Supreme Court re-
fused to enforce the exclusionary rule against the states, largely on the ground
that the states differed in their approach to the use of unconstitutional evidence
and had other methods of protecting the right to privacy recognized by the fourth
amendment. 367 U.S. at 651-52. In Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (954),
the Court again sought to defer to the state legislatures for a solution to police
misbehavior. 347 U.S. at 134. When a still significant number of states had
refused to act, the Court finally enforced the exclusionary rule against the states
in Mapp.
... Any objection that a provision of interstitial rules is an inherently anti-
democratic process would be at least partly met by the power of Congress to
strike a new balance of policy concerns.
14. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (i97o) (opinion of Brennan,
J.) (by implication); Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations,
40 U. CI. L. REv. 199, 228-29 (97X). One must, however, be careful not to
overstate the supposed superiority of legislative factfinding. Professor Wellington,
for example, notes that the "traditional statement" of a legislature's institutional
competence would be based on its supposed ability to find facts; however, he
argues that the type of fact upon which legislative decisions turn are generally
available to a court as well in the form of expert testimony so that any advantage
may be minimal. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 240 (1973).
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make either rough or finely tuned distinctions, justified by prac-
tical considerations though perhaps not by principle, in a manner
not generally thought open to a court.148 In addition, Congress
has at its command a range of remedies exceeding those available
to a court from which it can craft a solution for a problem. These
include wholesale suspension of offending state law,'49 the formu-
lation of rules to be enforced by courts, education programs,
administrative schemes, and spending programs. 50 In contrast,
even taking into account the far-reaching changes resulting from
modern class action practice, 151 a court is limited in its capacity
to affect the behavior of those not before it.' 52 And a common
law court can seldom do more than announce a rule and create
a sanction for its violation.'5 3
Extending individual liberty on a common law basis therefore
triggers an important shift in the political process. The Court,
in effect, opens a dialogue with Congress,154 but one in which the
factor of inertia is now on the side of individual liberty. For
instead of requiring an affirmative act by Congress and the Presi-
dent to protect individual liberty, such an act is necessary to deny
it. Even so, c6nstitutional common law contains built-in safe-
guards - where the Court's rule is perceived to have gone too far,
it can be rejected or modified by the political process without the
necessity of a constitutional amendment. 5 5 On the other hand, it
4
' See Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, x969 S. CT. REV.
81, 112-14.
.
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970).
ISO See Wellington, supra note 147, at 240. See generally HART & SACKS, supra
note 52, at 870-88.
I51 See Monaghan, supra note 38, at 1382-83.
152 Recent developments in the use of federal equitable powers to remedy
school segregation and other unconstitutional conduct must, however, be taken
into account. See, e.g., Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial
Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE LJ. 1338 (1975). They make
plain that it can no longer be assumed without qualification that most legislative
techniques are beyond the scope of federal equitable relief -although it is still
true that such extensive measures are available only against parties to a suit.
1.5 See Wellington, supra note 147, at 240.
"-, Professor Bickel long ago observed the possibilities of a dialogue even in




-A comprehensive analysis of congressional power with respect to a common
law of civil liberties is beyond the scope of what can be attempted here. One
might, however, explore whether congressional power should be inferred simply
from the fact that the Court can fashion constitutional common law-in much
the same manner that national legislative power has been inferred from the con-
stitutional grant of judicial jurisdiction in admiralty. See note 53 supra. One
might also consider whether the existence of a congressional duty, as in the first
amendment area, contains an implied grant of legislative power to achieve that
duty. Cf. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (i6 Pet.) 539, 612-21 (1842) (congres-
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is the Court, and not Congress, which in the end decides whether
a given rule is common law or something more.
III. SOME OBJECTIONS TO A CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMON LAW OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
However persuasive the analogies are between a constitutional
common law of individual liberties and more traditional areas of
constitutional common law, and however desirable the creation
of coordinate roles for the Court and Congress might be, im-
portant objections to a constitutional common law of civil liber-
ties are nonetheless not wanting. They seem to run along two
lines: first, any distinction between constitutional interpretation
and constitutional common law may be far too uncertain to be
useful; and, second, a constitutional common law of civil liberties
conflicts with our present conceptions of both separation of pow-
ers and federalism. These objections, both singly and in combi-
nation, are formidable, but I do not see them as insurmountable.
A. The Problem of Definition
It is obviously crucial to the theory advanced here that satis-
sional power to implement U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3). One will seldom be
required to pursue such lines of inquiry, however, since congressional power will
be readily apparent under more conventional theories. Congressional power to
define the duties of federal executive and administrative officials certainly includes
the power to prevent abuse of office. Similarly, no one doubts that Congress has
power to prescribe rules of procedure and evidence for the lower federal courts.
With respect to the states, much congressional legislation expanding civil rights
can be tied to conventional article I, § 8 sources, see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-62 (1964), and under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, Congress can fashion rules which the Court might deem to be neither
constitutionally required nor desirable common law. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-50 (1966). Any supposed federalism barriers to congressional
legislation under the fourteenth amendment seem to me virtually nonexistent as
Professors Cox and Cohen demonstrate. See Cox, supra note 147; Cohen, Con-
gressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. R..
6o3, 618 (,975). See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, ch. ii. Congressional
statutes directed to the state courts do not seem to me any different in principle.
See, e.g., IARr & WECHSLER, supra note 39, at 431-38, 562-73.
Congressional power under the fourteenth amendment need not be used to
expand civil rights. If the Supreme Court can prevent the state courts from in-
voking the Constitution to "overprotect" constitutional liberties, see Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (I975), I see no sound federalism objection to recognition of
a similar power in Congress. Congressional legislation overturning constitutional
common law seems to me just as "appropriate" under § 5 as congressional legis-
lative restrictions upon commerce under article I, § 8. In each case the policy
judgment of whether the Supreme Court's common law rule is too costly in terms
of other interests should be for Congress.
See also note 217 infra.
[Vol. 89:1
THE SUPREME COURT-FOREWORD
factory criteria exist for distinguishing between Marbury-shielded
constitutional exegesis and congressionally reversible constitu-
tional law. This is particularly important if Congress is to play
a meaningful role in defining the content of this body of law. The
decision to resolve a matter through legislation is for Congress
always one of discretion;' 56 and, unless a problem area is clearly
identified as one in which Congress may prescribe a solution,
nothing is likely to be done. Moreover, I think it can be assumed
that Congress is reluctant to pass statutes that force a confronta-
tion with the Supreme Court 5 7 and will therefore be hesitant to
exercise a revisionary authority where its power to do so is not
clear.
The Court can, of course, announce in future decisions what
it considers to be the common law (that is, alterable) elements
in its opinion, as it did in Miranda.'58 But a busy Court may
not, and in any event perhaps should not, regularly focus upon
making such distinctions. Moreover, if I am right, many extant
decisions constitute common law in the sense that the Court
would, if presented with a statute 159 taking a different approach
from a previously announced rule, inquire only whether the
statute was constitutional under traditional tests-treating the
statute's conflict with the -Court's own prior rule as a factor to
consider, but not as dispositive of unconstitutionality. Accord-
ingly, it is necessary that Congress be able to undertake a re-
visionary role without waiting for an express invitation in future
cases.
Plainly, any distinction between constitutional exegesis and
common law cannot be analytically precise, representing, as it
does, differences of degree. But I hope that we may be left with
something more than the "expert feel of lawyers," 160 or "I know
it when I see it," 161 although I do not denigrate the importance
of either feeling in this process.
156 See HART & SACKS, supra note 52, at 186-88.
" This can be seen in the congressional process leading to the enactment of
the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 197o and to Title II of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. In each case, Congress considered the con-
stitutional implications of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), apparently
concluding that its acts were constitutional. See Burt, supra note 148, at 225
(Title II); Cohen, supra note 155, at 609 (Voting Rights Act). See also Cox,
supra note 147, at 248-53.
"'S ee Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
150 See, e.g., i8 U.S.C. § 3501 (2970) (apparently overruling Miranda by mak-
ing failure to give warnings not conclusive).
10Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (i95)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
161 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
I1975]
It is appealing to seek a distinction in terms of the generality
of the rule being considered. Where the Court's rule "is so gen-
eral and absolute as to require no investigation or judgment of
the circumstances of the particular case," it might be character-
ized as "true" constitutional interpretation."0 2 But this distinc-
tion will not suffice wherever a common law rule, as in Miranda,
is designed to avoid a more particularized inquiry. 3 And it is
evident that such rules do not constitute exceptional cases: wit-
ness the specific rules developed in the procedural due process
cases which relieve the courts of the burden of making a factually
precise determination of whether the right to a fair hearing has
been violated in a given case 1164 -just as per se rules in antitrust
law avoid the necessity for more specific inquiry into whether
there has been an unreasonable restraint of trade in any particu-
lar case.-' 5 By contrast, a rule barring "unreasonable" searches
and seizures or "involuntary" confessions is a true constitutional
rule, even though every particular application would require an
ad hoc judgment.
Nor do I think much reliance can be placed upon the dis-
tinctions among principles, policies, standards, and rules,0 0 or
on Professor Jaffe's term, "intermediate premises" 11 - concepts
necessary to make more concrete such open-ended, indeterminate
constitutional guarantees as due process and equal protection.
These concepts, useful though they are for many purposes, can-
not mean that true constitutional interpretation embraces only
principles, policies, standards, and intermediate premises but not
specific rules. The crucial point is that some rules, as that term
is generally understood,'0 8 are true constitutional interpretations
"" Cox, supra note 147, at 203.
Similarly, when the application of the equal protection or due process
clause turns on a universal and relatively absolute rule of law not requiring
evaluation of the surrounding circumstances or resolution of questions of
degree . . .the equal protection clause of its own force prohibits [contrary
statutes) absolutely with no room for judgments upon particular conditions
or differences of degree.
Id. at 254.
13 Some qualifications of this view of Miranda are in order because of Michi-
gan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (failure to give one of Miranda warnings
held to be harmless error given "facts in [the] case"). Note also how the harm-
less error rule in fact operates to undermine the "absolute" character of a judicially
formulated rule by requiring assessment of the impact of the violation in the
individual case. See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S, 371 (X972).
'
4 See Note, supra note 135, at i5,7-z8 & n.36.
'
6 5 See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 586, 6og-io (1972).
'See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 52, at 255-6o; Wellington, supra note
147.
167 See generally Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate
Premises, 8o HARv. L. REv. 986 (x967).
'68See HART & SACKS, supra note 52, at I55-56.
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within the meaning of Marbury v. Madison, and some are not.
No clear discontinuity separates what are, at best, necessarily
differences of degree. Hart and Wechsler describe the situation
as follows:1 9
The demarcation between "statutory interpretation" or "consti-
tutional interpretation", on the one hand, and judge-made law
on the other, is not a sharp line. Statutory interpretation shades
into judicial lawmaking on a spectrum, as specific evidence of
legislative advertence to the issue at hand attenuates. We will
use the term, federal common law, loosely, as most judges and
commentators do, to refer generally to federal rules of decision
where the authority for a federal rule is not explicitly or clearly
found in federal statutory or constitutional command.
My own view is that the distinction between true constitutional
rules and constitutional common law lies in the clarity with which
the former is perceived to be related to the core policies under-
lying the constitutional provision.170  That defamation in con-
nection with public officials is actionable only if knowingly or
recklessly false impresses me as an "interpretative" constitutional
rule, if the central thrust of *the first amendment is taken to
eradicate the law of seditious libel. 7 ' By contrast, most of the
specific rules governing what constitutes a reasonable warrantless
search of an automobile 172 do not.
The same is true of the Miranda warnings. It is, of course,
clear that the proposition that no coerced confession is admissible
is of constitutional dimension. Perhaps, although less clearly so,
it is also a constitutional requirement that police interrogation be
consonant with specified rules, so that if a rule is broken, the
Court may invalidate a confession, because a court may be un-
able to ascertain ex post facto whether a confession was volun-
tary.173 However, were Congress to pass a statute requiring the
presence of counsel as a condition to introduction of any confes-
sion into evidence,1 4 the Court should be prepared to abandon
the warnings requirement, since counsel's presence during in-
109 HART & WECESLER, supra note 39, at 770.
10 Compare Professor Jaffe's "clear purpose" test in describing the point at
which courts should set aside "legal" interpretations of administrative agencies.
L. JAFI.E, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIoN 569-75 (I965).
271 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 386-87 ('974) (White, J.,
dissenting).
172 See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (I974).
17 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-69 (1966). But Miranda's rules
may not eliminate case-by-case adjudication, for attention will shift to whether
the warnings were fairly given, or were nullified by subsequent police misconduct.
17. Cf. i8 U.S.C. § 35oI(b)(5) (I97o) (assistance of counsel an element to be
considered in judging voluntariness of confession).
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terrogation would allow a court to ascertain voluntariness on a
case-by-case basis. Finally, the form of a rule which might be
made to apprise a suspect of his rights would almost surely be a
matter that Congress might change even if the Miranda Court
had not stated this expressly, since the form of the rule turns on
the subconstitutional consideration of the actual effectiveness of
the various forms of warning that might be given.
17
I recognize that, in the end, the line drawn here turns on such
untidy factors as the source and weight of the considerations that
inform a particular rule. The more a rule is perceived to rest
upon debatable policy choices or uncertain empirical foundations
the more likely it will be seen to be common law. However, in
the close case, there does not appear to be any particular reason
for Congress to abstain from legislating since controversy with
the Court over the characterization of rules at the margin of
constitutional liberties should not be disruptive of a productive
Court-Congress relationship6
B. Separation of Powers and Federalism
Congressional power to revise constitutional common law viti-
ates any objection that the Supreme Court, in fashioning inter-
stitial rules, violates separation of powers principles vis-h-vis
Congress. If Congress feels that the Court has overstepped per-
missible bounds, it can reverse a position taken by the Court
whenever a rule goes beyond constitutional exegesis.
It may nonetheless be objected that separation of powers
principles imply that the Court has no power to enforce sub-
constitutional rules against the executive department 'by way of
such devices as exclusionary rules, Miranda warnings, procedural
requirements, or judicial door-closing. Professor Hill is surely
right that "[w] e do not think of our own judges as heirs to the
English practice, such as it was, of constraining the executive
branch by rules developed from common law sources, subject to
the ultimate authority of the legislature." 177 A general, unde-
17- See 384 U.S. at 467; cf. Burt, supra note 148, at 126 (most effective factual
argument in support of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (i97o) -but one Congress did not make
- was the almost total ineffectiveness of the Court's prescribed warnings).
176 Congress' behavior in passing Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of x968, which included a provision designed to repeal Miranda,
see iS U.S.C. § 3501 (197o), is not to the contrary. The dispute there was not a
good faith dispute over the power of Congress to shape a rule protective of the
fifth amendment using its own assessment of how subconstitutional policies should
be compromised. It was rather "a gesture of defiance at a Court which protected
criminals and Communists, and attacked traditional religious, political, and social
institutions," Burt, supra note 148, at 127.
177J ill, supra note x17, at 208.
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fined, residual judicial power to pass judgment on the propriety
of executive law enforcement methods would, by intruding upon
executive autonomy, violate sound separation of powers princi-
ples,1 8 and the Supreme -Court has never overtly claimed any
such wide-ranging authority.'79 But even if it is conceded that
there is no general judicial warrant to apply against the executive
"an order of liberties on a level below the Constitution," ' I do
not see that this necessarily forecloses limited judicial lawmaking
to vindicate existing constitutional rights.' 8' Vindication of these
rights has been a traditional function of judicial review; and the
constitutionally inspired common law described here is similarly
designed to effectuate policies found in the text and structure of
the Constitution. So understood, constitutional common law does
not import a free-wheeling power to impose the judiciary's views
on the executive.
A second objection to a constitutional common law is that it
allows Supreme Court intrusion upon areas of state competence
in a manner inconsistent with Erie's fundamental presuppositions
with respect to the limits of federal judicial power to displace
state law.'82 This objection is, I think, of considerable force,
because the common law power here asserted goes beyond that
exercised when the Court displaces state law in areas of primary
national legislative competence. There, the state law is (or
should be) displaced only to the extent required by a preemption
analysis. A common law of civil liberties goes further; for it
postulates that the Court might itself assume primary responsi-
bility for a good part of the subconstitutional dimensions of con-
stitutionally rooted rights, whether or not any given state rule on
the subject was "minimally adequate" in a constitutional sense.'83
One response to this objection has already been suggested. 84
There is arguably a need for a uniform national definition of at
'7 8 See id. at 205-09.
17' See id. at 200.
The Court has developed a limited common law designed to control the
discretion of administrative agencies. See generally Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HaRv. L. REV. x667, 1676-81, 1698-1711, 1781-84
(1975). But the Court has not claimed that authority to develop this body of
law derives from a general residual power, but rather that these rules are inherent
in such constitutional concepts as due process or delegation. See generally id.
"'o Hill, supra note 17, at 208.
181 This is hardly the equivalent of inventing new constitutional rights. See
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-34 (1973).
'
8 2 See pp. 10-12 supra.
183 There may be exceptional circumstances, such as legislative redistricting,
where the courts should accept a minimally adequate state plan rather than search
for the best remedy. See Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 634-36 (5th Cir. 1975).
114 See p. I9 supra.
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least the significant dimensions of individual liberties having
their source in the Federal Constitution. The Court has the "final
say" in construing the ultimate limits placed on both federal and
state government by the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amend-
ment. The normal operation of judicial review permits the Court
to develop understandings about the basic content of constitu-
tional rights and at least arguably enables it to claim a special
institutional competence to formulate a coherent, cohesive sub-
structure of implementing rules. By contrast, the claim of judi-
cial competence is much weaker in the areas committed to plenary
national legislative power. Here Congress, not the Court, admit-
tedly has the final say. 8 5 Moreover, the Court, at least in recent
times, has not claimed for itself a competence to establish prin-
cipled criteria for what is "good" for commerce; it has, instead,
recognized this to be an area of inherent legislative discretion.
It would therefore be anomalous to allow states to upset well-
defined expectations about the content of federal rights by in-
sisting on federalism "at the edges," even though one may readily
concede full force to federalism concerns in the areas committed
to national legislative discretion.
There are, I think, additional considerations that blunt the
force of the federalism objection. First, the constitutional com-
mon law of individual liberties that has thus far emerged from
the cases has been an interstitial law, frequently required because
the state lawmaking organs have failed to prescribe specific con-
trols for executive and administrative officials; for example, they
have failed to prescribe adequate rules governing searches and
seizures or interrogations. There has yet to be a confrontation
between a specific, clearly articulated state rule, whether em-
bodied in a statute or otherwise, and the Court in the way in
which the commerce clause cases typically present the problem. 8
Indeed, it is quite possible, as will be discussed below, that the
Court would generally incorporate state rulemaking into its com-
mon law, thus softening any federalism conflict.
Second, the revisionary role of Congress provides a forum in
which state interests may be recognized and the Court reversed
2
8 5 See pp. 15-17 supra; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (I946).
186 This is somewhat of an oversimplification since the Court is reversing the
decisional law of the state when it applies federal common law rules in a situation
where state courts would not. State legislatures are entitled to rely on the deci-
sional law of their courts, see HART & SACxS, supra note 52, at z86-88, and may
legislate at their discretion, see id., thus there is a weak implication that legisla-
tive inaction indicates a desire not to enforce rules defined by the Court. This




if it delves too deeply in matters the states consider of local
concern. Thus, in a classic article, Professor Wechsler has ob-
served :187
Far from a national authority that is expansionist by nature, the
inherent tendency in our system is precisely the reverse, necessi-
tating the widest support before intrusive measures of impor-
tance can receive significant consideration, reacting readily to
opposition grounded in resistance within the states. . . . It is in
light of this inherent tendency, reflected most importantly in
Congress, that the governmental power distribution clauses of
the Constitution gain their largest meaning as an instrument for
the protection of the states.
Even though Professor Wechsler's conclusion rests partially on
the premise that it is congressional inertia that protects state in-
terests 188 - an assumption that is inapposite here since Congress
will have to act affirmatively to undo common law -it remains
true that state interests are forcibly represented in Congress.
Moreover, since it is unlikely that the federal government would
be any less constrained by constitutional common law than the
states,8 9 the interests of the states and the nation in removing
unduly intrusive common law would overlap, thereby maximizing
the "clout" which the states enjoy in Congress. 10
Finally, the force of the federalism objection is reduced still
further when one focuses upon the flexibility of federal common
law. Even though an area of the law is governed by federal au-
thority, the Court is free to incorporate implementing state rules
consistent with underlying federal policies. 19' Miranda and the
lineup cases are examples of situations where the Court has, at
least formally, envisioned such an adoption of state law: the
states are obliged to provide a minimum level of protection-
"something that works" 192 - but ultimately the choice of means
is left to them. Wherever it seems likely that state rulemaking
would provide resolution of a problem superior to that of a court
187 See Wechsler, supra note 58, at 558.
188 See id. at 547-48.
18. Indeed, the federal government has often been constrained where the states
were not; witness the history of application of the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule to the states described in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-55 (g6i).
'90To be sure, Congress represents a national constituency as well as the in-
terests of the states as states. It might, therefore, decide that a uniform national
law remained appropriate even though the Court's rule was not correct. But
nationalization by congressional action does not present the federalism objection
raised by the concept of a constitutional common law. See note 155 supra.
' See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 39, at 768-70.
192 Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1o3o.
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remedy, the Court might adopt state law.193 The appeal of adopt-
ing state law is reinforced by the powerful current of present
academic and extra-judicial commentary that favors state rule-
making as the best method for structuring police and other execu-
tive and administrative activity." 4
Nonetheless, the Court cannot invariably defer to state rule-
making merely because it is consistent with federal policy and
provides minimally adequate protection for civil liberties. Since
the justification for framing constitutional common law is both
the possible need for a nationally uniform law and the Court's
admitted competence in creating law consistent with its constitu-
tional precedents and analysis, the Court surely has the power to
reject state law- even where the Court is acting in a frankly
experimental manner.' 95 Alternatively, it might, as a matter of
constitutional common law, require additional rulemaking.111
The federalism objection, therefore, is not decisive when both
the affirmative reasons for allowing the Court to make constitu-
tional common law and the checks on the Court in this regard are
considered.
C. One-Way Common Law
The possibility that some diversity on the state level can be
tolerated raises another fundamental question: Should the Court
consciously formulate constitutional common law to be applied
to the federal government alone? As an example, in order to
implement the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the Second
Circuit promulgated rules requiring dismissal of criminal charges
unless the government is ready for trial within six months of
arrest, or within ninety days if the defendant is detained. 197 The
193 There appears to be little reason for the Court to adopt a position an-
nounced in a decision of a state court (unless it constitutes rulemaking) because
there is no reason to suppose that a state court has any greater competence in
framing an appropriate rule than the Supreme Court. Furthermore, when a rule
is announced, as in Miranda, for controlling executive misconduct, the force of
the rule can be sapped by allowing its reitigation in each case. If the misbehaving
officer can hope to succeed in an individual case, then the deterrent value of the
rule is lessened.
194 See the discussion and authorities collected in K. DAvis, POLICE DISCRETION
98-120 (1975). See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 409-39 (1974).
195 The Court has insisted on a uniform rule in a number of cases. See, e.g.,
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(i961).
.
9 See K. DAvis, supra note 194, at 129 ("Judicially required rulemaking is
destined to become a mainstream of the law.").
197 Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, 28
U.S.C.A. Rules Appendix 8i (Supp. 1975), discussed in Comment, Speedy Trials
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Supreme Court has, correctly in my judgment, cast considerable
doubt on whether these rules could be taken to be a necessary
part of the underlying constitutional guarantee. 198 Nonetheless,
practical difficulties in administering that guarantee 19' make the
Second Circuit's approach an attractive one. The important point
here, however, is that the Second Circuit, on federalism grounds,
refused to extend its rules to the states, grounding them instead
on its "supervisory power." 200 The end result is, I submit, a
constitutionally based common law rule designed to vindicate a
fundamental constitutional guarantee, 'but one which binds only
federal officials. The Second Circuit's action was not without
respectable antecedents. It is, after all, surely apparent that the
McNabb-Mallory rule,2 ' promulgated in the name of the Su-
preme Court's supervisory power, had substantial constitutional
underpinnings 202 and could be rationalized completely in com-
mon law terms.2
0 3
As the supervisory power cases demonstrate, there seems to
be no reason in principle why constitutional common law must
invariably extend to state as well as to federal officials. While
and the Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Dispositions of Criminal Cases, 7,
COLUm. L. REV. I059 (1971).
" See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972). The Second Circuit agrees
that the six-month rule is not a constitutional requirement. See Wallace v. Kern,
499 F.2d X345, 1349-50 (2d Cir. 2974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (i975).
... See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972). See also Moore v. Arizona,
4X4 U.S. 25, 27 (2973).21 0 See United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312, '316-,7 (2d
Cir. 1971) (en banc). Congress has similarly not extended the recently enacted
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975), to be codified in 18 U.S.C. §§
3161-74, to the states.
201 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (i957); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (2943).
202 See, e.g., Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d ii6i, 1I65 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Another example is the extensive judicial control over FBI data collection and
dissemination portended by Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d Ii6 (D.C. Cir. 2974),
ostensibly resting upon the construction of a statute, but imposed to vindicate
constitutionally rooted policies. See id. at 1123-25. See also Chastain v. Kelley,
5io F.2d 1232, 2235 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
202 The same is true of the "Jencks rule," United States v. Jencks, 353 U.S.
657 (X957), allowing discovery of FBI files relating to the testimony of govern-
ment witnesses in criminal trials. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343,
362-63 (I959) (Brennan, J., concurring); United States v. Nobles, 95 S. Ct. 216o,
2166 (2975) (confrontation considerations give federal courts "inherent power to
require [production of] previously recorded statements of ...witnesses . . .).
Similarly, in United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133 (I975), the Court exercised
its supervisory power to require a new trial because an "evidentiary matter
hav[ing] grave constitutional overtones ... ," id. at 2138 n.7, quoting Grune-




constitutional common law is informed, but not required, by the
underlying constitutional guarantee, this fact still leaves open the
question of against whom it applies. Accordingly, recognition of((one-way" common law has important significance for the still
ongoing "incorporation" debate. One might adopt the view of
Justice Powell that all the bag and baggage of the Bill of Rights
does not apply to the states,214 by arguing that the common law
components of the right do not necessarily carry over. Whether
they do so is a separate issue in which the value of the particular
common law rule must be assessed in light of possibly counter-
vailing federalism considerations. 5
IV. NEw DnRECTIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMON LAW
Recognition of constitutional common law provides a basis
for doctrinal development in the context of the guarantees of
individual liberty. As an illustration of possible lines of develop-
ment, I will suggest a number of examples of how common law
might be used to extend, or contract, current doctrine - whether
any specific example is sound depends upon a more careful assess-
ment that can be given here.
A. Implementing Specific Guarantees
i. Mapp v. Ohio Revisited. - Recent decisions indicate that
Mapp's exclusionary rule is no longer considered part and parcel
of the underlying fourth amendment right nor a necessary rem-
edy for it. But Mapp might nonetheless be justified in constitu-
tional common law terms as an appropriate remedy, although an
imperfect one. Arguments for some form of exclusionary rule
possess considerable appeal. "As a visible expression of social
disapproval for the violation of [fourth amendment] guarantees,"
writes Professor Oaks, "the exclusionary rule makes the guaran-
tees . . .credible." 206 And, "[o]ver the long term this may
integrate some fourth amendment ideals into the value system or
norms of behavior of law enforcement agencies." 207 I would not
minimize this argument. The Court plays an important role as a
teacher in our democracy. Accordingly, to the extent that the
""See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 369-77 (1972) (Powell, J., con-
curring).
2°The substantive right unsuccessfully sought to be raised in Costarelli v.
Massachusetts, 421 U.S. 193 (I975), the right to an initial jury trial, might be
viewed as common law "baggage."
206 Oaks, supra note 33, at 71r.
207 Id. at 756. See also Amsterdam, supra note 194, at 429-33.
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Court is persuaded that the fostering of constitutionally based
values is a significant goal and that an exclusionary rule in some
form is an effective means of achieving it, the Court could con-
tinue to insist upon the rule whether or not a state had provided
some other minimally adequate alternative.
More importantly, since the exclusionary rule is now concep-
tualized as something other than constitutional exegesis, its exist-
ing rationales invite consideration of whether the present content
of the rule should be reshaped. Proposals for change abound.0
Most have a common foundation: Since the object of excluding
evidence is to deter police violations of an individual's right of
privacy, the exclusionary rule should be invoked only against
egregious or serious police misconduct, and not where the deter-
rence rationale has only marginal significance. Acceptance of
this proposition would lead to a "good faith defense" to the
exclusionary rule where, for example, police conduct is in only
technical violation of increasingly complex fourth amendment
law. 09 I see little reason why such a defense should not be
allowed in a criminal trial -- where the central issue is, after all,
not the officer's conduct, but the defendant's guilt- when good
faith is recognized as a defense in a suit against a police officer
for violation of an individual's right of privacy under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 where the officer's violation is the core of the suit.2 10 In
any event, United States v. Peltier 21' makes plain that the Court
is impressed by considerations of this order 212 and, unless I
misread it, the case already commits the Court to modify the
exclusionary rule when the opportufnity to do so next permits.
Exclusion will no longer automatically be required unless the
police have engaged in either wilfull or negligent wrongdoing.2 13
Peltier does not consider still another possible limitation on
the exclusionary rule. Since the exclusionary rule is only a rem-
edy, its costs, like the costs of other remedies to vindicate con-
stitutional rights, must be evaluated.214 One could conclude, as
20 See, e.g., ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 290.2(2) (Offi-
cial Draft No. I, 1972).
09 See generally Brown v. Illinois, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2265 (i975) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part), noted pp. 68-70 infra.
210 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967); cf. Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (,975) (Congress did not intend to remove common law immunities of
state officers by enacting § 1983), noted pp. 2X9-25 infra; Scheur v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 243-45 (1974) ("reasonable" conduct is immune from § 1983 liability).
211 95 S. Ct. 2313 (,975).
212 See p. 4 supra.
2"IThe Court might also modify the exclusionary rule where the police had
made rules governing search and seizure practice. See note 194 supra.
214 Cf. Brown v. Illinois, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2264 (I975) (Powell, J., concurring
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does Professor Kaplan, that on a cost-benefit analysis the remedy
is inappropriate where the defendant is charged with a serious
crime.215 To be sure, in Brown v. Illinois,21 6 decided one day after
Peltier, the Court did apply the exclusionary rule in a homicide
case where the police misconduct was plainly viewed as serious.
But Brown did not consider whether the limitation suggested by
Professor Kaplan should be developed.21 7
2. Criminal Procedure.- While the prospects for expansion
of the rights of criminal defendants are presently unpromising,
a further development would be possible under the rubric of con-
stitutional common law. For example, Justice Brennan's often
repeated contention that the constitutional restriction against
double jeopardy requires all criminal offenses stemming from a
single set of facts to be tried at once, 18 could plausibly be ad-
in part) ("[uIn some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforce-
ment than can be justified by [its] deterrent purposes."), noted pp. 68-7o infra.
212 Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1o46-49.
21695 S. Ct. 2254 (i975), noted pp. 68-70 infra.
217 An analysis of Miranda could be made in terms similar to the analysis here
of Mapp. Indeed, Congress may already have concluded that it is too costly to
treat violation of the Miranda rules as a per se violation of the fifth amendment.
Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 35oi(b) (I97O) (failure to give warnings does not automatically
require exclusion of a confession in a federal prosecution).
Congress' power to revise Miranda may not, however, be unlimited. Even
where the crucial issue is not one of law, but of fact, characterization, or degree,
it is arguable that Marbury, when read with a substantive constitutional guarantee,
requires considerably more judicial scrutiny than would otherwise exist. See, e.g.,
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374, 378-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring). On the other hand, such issues are also of a type peculiarly subject to
legislative determination, see pp. 28-29 & notes 147-53 supra; and once any judicial
deference to Congress on these issues is admitted, principled and effective limits
on the scope of that deference are difficult to frame beyond a general requirement
of reasonableness, see Cohen, supra note I55, at 612. Accordingly, a strong argu-
ment can be made that the congressional overruling of Miranda, by way of
statute, is valid. Congress, it would be urged, has only differed on the "facts"
surrounding the assumed relationship between custodial interrogation and voluntary
confessions. Compare Schrock & Welsh, supra note x6, at 251, with Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (I974). But these contradictory positions need not be
reconciled to decide Miranda; I agree with Professor Cox that Miranda is less
concerned with factual assessment than with the development of a "prophylactic"
rule to minimize the special dangers to the privilege against self-incrimination
which are thought to inhere in custodial interrogation, see Cox, supra note 147,
at 251. The required warnings are, in Professor Cox's language, "not constitutional
commands but judge-made regulations for implementing or securing constitutional
commands." Id. Miranda thus holds that "adequate" safeguards are constitu-
tionally required, and this puts a check on what Congress may do. On the other
hand, Congress seems free to determine the details of implementing an "adequate"
rule.
218 See, e.g.; Waugh v. Gray, 9S S. Ct. 2622 (1975) (mem.) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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vanced as a desirable federal common law rule, one consistent
with, if not required by, the double jeopardy and due process
clauses. One could also fashion common law, grounded on the
right to counsel or due process, reaching such diverse areas as
the prosecution's duty to disclose evidence and the appointment
of experts at a defendant's request. In short, one could with in-
genuity impose on the states through constitutional common law
all the best features of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence. 9
3. Free Speech.- Justice Stewart has recently advanced
the thesis that the protection afforded the press by the first
amendment means more than the freedom of speech guaranteed
to all citizens. It is, he says, not an individual liberty, but an
institutional one; the fourth estate is the one business given ex-
plicit protection by the Constitution.120 Advanced at so late a
date in first amendment history as "true" constitutional inter-
pretation, this position is both doubtful and troublesome. But it
might serve as a foundation for the development of federal com-
mon law rules about the press. Indeed, a different result in
Branzburg v. Hayes 221 can be rationalized along constitutional
common law lines- some press privilege, although not constitu-
tionally required, is consistent with the policies inhering in the
guarantee of freedom of the press.
The overbreadth doctrine formulated in Broadrick v. Okla-
homa 222 seems to me a candidate for reassessment in common
law terms. There the Court held that a challenger could attack
a statute regulating "pure speech" on its face without showing
either substantial overbreadth, or the arguably protected charac-
ter of his own speech. 3  Without debating the wisdom of either
dispensation as a matter of judicially formulated common law, I
find it difficult to believe that either is a necessary inference from
the first amendment. 24
I" But see Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 929 (I965) (arguing against imposing an inflexible code of criminal
procedure on the states).
220 See Stewart, "Or of the Press," reprinted in YALE L. REP. 9, io (Winter
1974-75) (address to Yale Law School on its i5oth anniversary). Bue see Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (i974) ; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (i974).
2214o8 U.S. 665 (1972).
222 413 U.S. 6oi (1974).
22 3 id. at 61'-13. See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 95 S. Ct. 2222, 2229-30 (i975),
noted pp. 111-23 infra; Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 3 U974).
224See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 147-48 (1966) (Brennan, J., con-
curring).
The curious disposition of the overbreadth claim in Bigelow v. Virginia,
95 S. Ct. 2222, 2229-30 (1975), noted pp. 111-23 infra, lends support to my view.
The Court concluded in Bigelow that the Virginia courts "erred in denying [the
1975]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
V. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW, THE NON-SPECIFIC
GUARANTEES, AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Recognition of a congressionally reversible, constitutionally
based common law implementing the guarantees of individual
liberty might help to bridge the gap between, or at least add
another dimension to, the perennial conflict between two diver-
gent views of the substantive scope of judicial review. It may
very well be that throughout our constitutional history courts
have assumed the power to impose "basic national ideals of indi-
vidual liberty and fair treatment" 22 5 on political bodies, national
as well as state, and that it is now clear that the decline of eco-
nomic substantive due process may not have fundamentally al-
tered this fact. There are those who approve of the exercise of
such judicial power as consistent with our history and tradi-
tions.22 On the other hand, there is a large and increasingly
vocal body of scholars who reject the view, asserting that an
appropriate conception of our framework of government precludes
general judicial authority to develop an order of constitutional
liberties not specified in the Constitution. Professor Ely, an ar-
ticulate exponent of this view, denies that the Court has any
general license to formulate "neutral and durable" principles,
and that however "beautiful," if the principle "lacks connection
with any value the Constitution marks as special, it is not a
constitutional principle and the Court has no business imposing
it." 227 The assumption common to both camps is, of course, that
the judicially fashioned rules are beyond the reach of Congress.
To my mind, the most troublesome feature of constitutional
common law is its potential as a vehicle for reading into our law
at a subconstitutional level values that judicial activists have
"discovered" in the general substantive guarantees of due process
defendant] standing to make [the overbreadth] claim, where 'pure speech' rather
than conduct was involved . . . " Id. at 223o. Nonetheless, because the statute
under which the defendant was convicted had subsequently been repealed, the
Court declined to consider the overbreadth question. See id. This is a wholly
incomprehensible disposition if overbreadth implicates personal rights of the de-
fendant. The disposition of the overbreadth claim in Erznoznik v. City of Jack-
sonville, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 2276-77 (i975), noted pp. 123-31 infra, is also consistent
with a "no personal right" approach.
225 Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAzr. L. REv. 7o3, 7o6
(1975).
12 11d. See also Michelman, The Supreme Court, r968 Term-Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 7
(i969); Tribe, Structural Due Process, io HAiv. Civ. RitHTs-Civ. LID. L. Rv.
269 (1975).
227 Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
LJ. 920, 949 (1973).
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and equal protection. It is around these general constitutional
clauses- with an occasional reference to that bottomless and
empty well, the ninth amendment - that the debate centers. In-
tellectually and emotionally I stand in the Ely camp. Here, at
least, I would draw the line. The general guarantees of due pro-
cess and equal protection are so indeterminate in character that
to develop on their authority a body of subconstitutional law
would be to go beyond implementation to recognize a judicial
power to create a sub-order of liberties without any ascertainable
constitutional reference points.
This is not to say that, if the Constitution is used as a spring-
board for the judicial imagination, there is no place for con-
stitutional common law. The Supreme Court's announcements
of hitherto unknown constitutional values are inevitably accom-
panied by attempts at implementation. Roe v. Wade's trimes-
ters 228 are a classic illustration. Although the propriety of the
values the Court implements is inevitably a question of consti-
tutional law, the form of the implementation, here as elsewhere,
can present questions of common law. Indeed, it is in cases of
judicial innovation that the notion of constitutional common law,
involving as it does a coordinate role for Congress, may be of
most service. Congressional debate concerning the means of im-
plementing new-found values may provide the Supreme Court
with much-needed feedback as to the implications, and indeed
the propriety, of its activism.
Professor Michelman concluded his activist essay in these
pages six years ago with a question - "why education and not
golf?" 221 My -answer is: neither. But if the Court were to
answer, it seems to me better that it do so in a context in which
constitutional common law gives Congress a role in fixing the
consequences.
228 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (i973).
21 Michelman, supra note 226, at 59.
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